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Does Copyright Law Promote
Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of
Copyright's Bounty
Raymond Shih Ray Ku,
JiayangSun, Yiying Fan
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669 (2009)
Modern copyright law is based upon a theory: increase
copyright protection and you increase the number of creative works
available to society. This theory has been the driving force behind an
economic vision that has expanded, beyond all recognition, the
original law created by the Statute of Anne. And with this
expansion, we are told that the costs associated with copyright are
worthwhile because of the bounty it produces. What if this theory
could be tested? After all, this is not a question of faith or morality,
nor is it a statement on how humans should behave; it is a theory
about how humans do behave. In this Article, we use statistical
analysis to test the theory that increasing copyright protection
usually increases the number of new creative works. Relying upon
U.S. copyright registrationsfrom 1870 through 2006 as a proxy for
the number of works created, we consider how four variablespopulation, the economy, legal changes, and technology-influenced
subsequent copyright registrations. Our findings cast serious doubt
on the idea that with copyright law, one size fits all. While
individual legal changes may be associated with changes in
subsequent copyright registrations, the overall relationship between
changes in copyright law and registrationsis neither consistent nor
completely predictable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1841, Thomas Babington Macaulay delivered a speech in the
British Parliament in which he famously described copyright as "a tax
on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers."1 While critics
of copyright law often use this quote as a general objection to
copyright, that was not the intent. Macaulay was not opposed to
copyright per se. Instead, he was skeptical that a proposal to increase
the length of copyright protection would yield much in return.
Following this famous quote, Macaulay went on to say:
I admit, however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius and learning. In order to
give such a bounty, I willingly submit even to this severe and burdensome tax. Nay, I
am ready to increase the tax, if it can be shown that by so doing I should proportionally
increase the bounty. My complaint is, that my hon[orable] and learned [flriend doubles,
2
triples, quadruples, the tax, and makes scarcely any perceptible addition to the bounty.

As such, the problem was not copyright itself, nor even the
monopoly costs associated with copyright, which he described in that
same speech as a necessary evil. 3 The problem was that changing
copyright law and expanding copyright's exclusive rights might not
provide the public with any real benefit. While Macaulay was
successful in defeating the 1841 effort to expand copyright, 4 more
5
often than not, lawmakers have not shared his skepticism.
In the United States, the history of copyright law is one of
expansion. For example, in 1790, copyright originally provided
authors the exclusive right to vend books and maps for fourteen years
with an additional fourteen years of protection available through
renewal. 6 Currently, copyright protects all original expression fixed in
a tangible medium of expression, which includes books, motion
pictures, sound recordings, broadcasts of sporting events, and video
games.7 It provides authors the exclusive right to control almost all
uses of their writings-even the ability to create new works based

1.
56 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1841) 350, reprinted in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT
(1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.), www.copyrighthistory.org [hereinafter
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES].
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 348.
4. Id. at 360.
5.
See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
6. Id.
7.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir.
1982).
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upon the original.8 Moreover, this protection generally lasts for the life
of the author plus an additional seventy years. 9
The logic behind this expansion is straightforward. Copyright
law provides authors with exclusive rights in their works.10 In turn,
these exclusive rights allow successful authors to obtain financial
reward for their works by creating a market for them instead of
forcing them to seek private or government patronage. The greater the
protection, the greater the reward; the greater the reward, the greater
the incentive to create new works; and the greater the incentive to
create new works, the greater the number of new works created. To
paraphrase Macaulay, by increasing the financial bounty available to
of
authors, we ultimately increase the public's bounty of new works
12
authorship.1 In other words, copyright law promotes creativity.
The argument may be simply summarized: if a little copyright
is good, more is better. While logical, this position is still a theory and,
like all theories, can be tested. Unfortunately, even though copyright
has existed and continuously expanded for hundreds of years, there
has been little research done to test the theoretical basis for
copyright's expansion.' 3 In fact, so little has been done that one author
specifically pled for more empirical research. 14 This study responds to
that need.
In this Article, we use statistical analysis to examine whether
changes in copyright law influence the number of new works created.
Relying upon U.S. copyright registrations from 1870 through 2006 as
a proxy for the number of works created, we consider how four
8.

17 U.S.C. § 106.

9.

Id. § 302(a).

10.

Id. § 106.

11.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 1, at 350.

12. I use this term loosely, and it would be more accurate to say that copyright encourages
or rewards the creation of new works, and not that these works are necessarily more imaginative
or insightful.
13.

See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 210 (2003); Brief of George A. Akerlof & Kenneth J. Arrow et. al
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618);
see also Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2008) (analyzing whether lack of copyright protection led to
underutilization of fictional books). While some have argued against the need for any copyright
protection, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7

(2008) (concluding that copyright, trademark, and patent rights are a "unnecessary evil");
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350 (1970) (asserting that "the general case for
copyright is weak"), our study does not address that question. Instead, it examines whether
changes to copyright law after 1870 affect subsequent copyright registrations.
14. See Ivan P.L. Png, Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research, 3 REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3 (2006) (summarizing the available research and finding it insufficient).
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variables-population, the economy, changes in the law (both
legislative and judicial), and technology-influenced new copyright
registrations. From the data, we test the following hypotheses. The
major hypothesis is that any change in copyright protection will result
in changes in the number of works produced. The related minor
hypotheses are that increasing copyright protection will increase the
number of works produced and-its corollary-that decreasing
copyright protection will reduce the number of works produced.
Despite the logic of the theory that increasing copyright
protection will increase the number of copyrighted works, the data do
not support it. Instead, our findings demonstrate that the historic
long-run growth in new copyrighted works is largely a function of
population. 15 Sharp changes are mostly due to procedural shifts in
copyright registration, such as those created by the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988.16
This is the first comprehensive study examining the
relationship between changes in copyright law and changes in new
copyright registrations. It employs statistical change-point analysis,
parametric time series regression analysis, and nonparametric
regression analysis with simultaneous confidence bounds around the
registration growth curves. It relies upon the most complete set of
data for U.S. copyright registrations to date. Moreover, instead of
relying entirely upon overall registration data, this study examines
the relationship of changes in copyright law with respect to individual
categories of works, including monographs and sound recordings, and
sub-categories of works, such as performing arts. It considers all fiftysix congressionally created statutes and Supreme Court decisions that
occurred between 1870 and 2006 together with four other concurrent
variables-population,
the
economy,
registration
fees,
and
technological change.
The only published work on this topic to date anecdotally
considered five changes of the law and observed that two laws
extending the length of copyright protection yielded no statistically
significant changes in the number of new works produced. 17

15. Our findings complement the results of Michael Kremer's work on the relationship
between population and technological change. See Michael Kremer, Population Growth and
Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990, 108 Q. J. ECON. 681, 681-716 (1993). Kremer's
model, however, holds constant the "share of resources devoted to research," id. at 681, while our
study includes legal and technological change as variables that may alter the share of resources
devoted to artistic creation.
16. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
17.

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 247.
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Nonetheless, the authors of that study, William Landes and Richard
Posner, continue to contend that increasing copyright protection
should generally increase the number of new works produced.1 8 They
argue that term extension is an aberration because "the expected
commercial life of a copyrighted work is so much shorter than the
copyright term that it makes a lengthening of the term irrelevant to
most potential registrations."' 19 Presumably, laws that expand
copyright protections to new works and grant authors new rights,
remedies, and penalties against those who infringe those works are
more likely to influence authors. These laws increase the
opportunities and markets that successful copyright owners may
exploit during the commercial life of the work. In other words,
increasing the length of copyright increases the amount of time an
author may benefit from a particular revenue stream, while a change
in the breadth of copyright increases the number and reliability of
revenue streams. If one views copyright's incentive regime as
analogous to a lottery, 20 by adding the right to control public
performances, digital distribution, and derivative works, the law
effectively expands the size of the copyright jackpot. Likewise, changes
to the remedies available for violations of copyright law, such as
providing copyright owners with statutory damages or increasing the
prison time for criminal infringement, help assure authors that their
payoffs will be protected.
Contrary to Landes and Posner's suggestion, our study reveals
that their anecdotal observations regarding term extension are not
aberrational. Instead, our findings demonstrate that there is no
uniform or fully predictable statistical relationship between laws that
increase copyright term, subject matter, rights, or criminal penalties
and the number of new works registered in general. Overall, the most
one can expect is a 38 percent chance that a law increasing copyright
protection will lead to an increase in the number of new registrations
for a single, unknown category of copyrighted work. Laws that reduce
or otherwise limit copyright protection are actually more likely to
increase the number of new works. Even then, the relationship is far
from uniform or predictable. As such, the data suggest that these
relationships may be essentially random. Population is uniformly and
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Cf. F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3-21, (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, & Harry First
eds., 2001) (discussing the lottery aspects of intellectual property regimes); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER,

CAPITALISM,

SOCIALISM,

AND

phenomenon as part of a capitalistic economy).

DEMOCRACY

73-74

(1942)

(describing

this
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consistently the best predictor of the number of new works produced.
So while increasing copyright protection may increase the rewards
available to authors, it does little to change their incentives overall.
Consequently, this study provides valuable insight into the
relationship between law and human behavior. A growing body of
research in law, psychology, and economics asks the same question:
Does law actually influence individual decisionmaking and behavior?
In other words, when and under what circumstances does law matter?
When law does influence individual behavior, how do individuals react
to the rewards and penalties created by law? For example, social
norms theorists have focused on the relationship between law and
social norms, 2 1 and behavioralists have studied, among other things,
22
whether the death penalty actually serves as a deterrent to crime.
While the traditional economic model of human behavior has formed
the theoretical basis for the proposition that increasing legal
protection for copyrighted works should increase the number of new
works created, this Article argues not only that there is little
empirical support for that uniform proposition, but that-when
properly understood-the rational, wealth-maximizing model itself
does not predict such a change in behavior. This insight is critically
important for evaluating copyright policy and the balance of costs and
benefits associated with copyright protection, and it therefore
contributes to our understanding of how individuals respond to legally
created
incentives.
Specifically,
this
study
increases
our
understanding of when and under what circumstances individuals will
likely change their behavior-here, by producing more creative
works-in response to changes in the potential rewards made possible
by legally created rights.
Part II of this Article discusses copyright's historic growth and
the incentive justification for copyright's expansion. This history
includes the central role that the incentive justification played in the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, which upheld
Congress's decision to extend copyright protection by an additional
twenty years. 23 Part III reviews the existing empirical research and
explains how this study adds to this underdeveloped body of
literature. Part IV explains our study, including a general description
21. See generally THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed.,
2004).
22. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710-16 (2005) (summarizing the
debate); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors
That Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 174 (2004).
23. 537 U.S. 186, 206-17 (2003).
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of our methodology and our findings. A detailed discussion of the
statistical methodology, modeling, and results is included in the
statistical appendix that follows this Article. 24 Based upon this
analysis, Part IV concludes that the data do not support the major or
minor hypotheses-let alone the proposition that increasing copyright
protection always increases the number of new copyrighted works
produced. Part V explains why many of the changes to copyright law
do not appear to influence the number of new works produced by
authors. It further argues that our understanding of the existing
economic model predicting such a change is incomplete and, more
fundamentally, relies upon dubious assumptions. As such, Part V
contends that even a basic economic model of human behavior does
not support the proposition that increasing copyright protection will
increase the number of new works produced. While increasing
copyright protection provides authors with the opportunity to obtain
greater rewards, these changes in the law do not create additional
incentives to create new works. After arguing that scant empirical or
theoretical support exists for expanding copyright protection as a
reliable strategy to increase the number of new copyrightable works,
Part VI of this Article concludes by outlining four general strategies
for increasing the number of such works in the future.

24.

See infra app. 1.
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II. EXPANSION AND EXPLANATION
A. COPYRIGHT'S GROWTH
It is often said that death and taxes are the only guarantees in
life. After even a cursory examination of the history of copyright law,
one might add that the expansion of copyright law is guaranteed as
well. As discussed above, in the United States copyright originally
provided authors the exclusive right to vend books and maps for
fourteen years, with an additional fourteen years of protection if
renewed. Currently, copyright protects all original expression fixed in
a tangible medium. 25 This expansion did not happen all at once.
Instead, it is the product of the gradual accretion of copyright
protection as the result of both legislative enactment and judicial
judgments. As Chart 1 illustrates, Congress has consistently given
copyright owners control over additional uses of their works and has
increased the length of time during which they might exercise such
26
control.

25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2008).
26. Two important areas of copyright expansion are not represented in Chart 1. The first
involves the term of copyright protection. Originally, the length of copyright protection was
divided into an original term and a renewal term. In order to benefit from the renewal term
copyright owners were required to file a renewal registration. Failure to file such a registration
meant that copyright law would no longer protect the work. As part of Congress' revision of
copyright law in 1976, copyrighted works created after January 1, 1978 are now subject to a
unitary term. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). As such, the chart notes the potential maximum length of
protection without regard to renewals. The chart also does not note the changes in copyright
formalities such as registration, notice, and deposit that also affect the substantive rights that
may be enjoyed by copyright owners.
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CHART 1. INCREASING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OVER TIME

1790

1856

0 Print, reprint, publish and vend

1909

1870
a Perform (for profit)

uTranslate

Any other work

1976
Perform (no profit)

1998
. Display

While the scope of copyright has expanded over time, it is
equally true that, as a general matter, the number of copyrighted
works produced each year has also increased. Charts 2 and 3 illustrate
this increase in the number of copyrighted works produced. Chart 2
displays the aggregate number of copyright registrations, including
renewal registrations, filed each year from 1870 to 2006. Chart 3
illustrates the total number of new registrations filed in various
subcategories. At first blush, it appears that there is a relationship
between copyright's expansion and the number of new works created.
Likewise, it also appears that there is some support for the claim that
new technologies-including digital technologies and the Internetmay have disrupted the otherwise steady growth of creative works.
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CHART 2. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS (1870-2006)
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After all, there has been a precipitous drop in the number of
copyright registrations after 1991, which some may identify as the
year that the most recent array of disruptive technologies were first
introduced. 27 Likewise, the number of copyright registrations also
became increasingly volatile after 1991.
While the remainder of the paper is dedicated to analyzing the
claim that increased legal protection leads to more copyright
registrations, the claim that new technologies are hurting creativity
can be challenged rather quickly. First, as illustrated in Chart 3, the
drop in serial registrations-that is, registrations for newspapers,
magazines, and other periodicals-accounts for a substantial portion
of the drop in overall copyright registrations. Prior to 1991, these
registrations were on par with the number of registrations for
monographs. After 1991, these registrations began to decline rapidly
to the point that serial registrations currently represent less than onefourth of the number of registrations for monographs. This decline
might be explained by the changing nature of the market caused by
factors such as industry consolidation, competition from competing
media outlets in cable television (and subsequently, the Internet), and
increased copyright infringement.
However, the decline may also be directly linked to changes in
U.S. Copyright Office policy. For works published after January 7,
1991, the Copyright Office began allowing copyright owners to file
group registrations rather than individual registrations for serials
published at intervals of one week or longer. 28 Similarly, the
Copyright Office began allowing daily newspapers to file group
registrations effective September 1, 199229 and daily newsletters to
30
file group registrations for their works as well after July 1, 1999.
Because of these changes in the rules for registration, the decrease in
serials registrations may not reflect a decrease in the number of
serials produced, but instead a decrease in the number of registrations
filed. So while changing markets and technology may still be factors,
they are by no means the only-or even the best-explanations for the
decline in serial and, therefore, overall registrations.

27.

1991 was the year in which CERN launched the World Wide Web (WWW). ROBERT H.

ZAKON, HOBBES INTERNET TIMELINE (2006), http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/.

By

comparison, Napster, which ushered in the era of peer-to-peer file sharing, was not introduced
until 1999. Alejandro Zentner, Piracy and Filesharing:Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on
Music Purchases,49 J.L. & ECON. 63, 63-64 (2006).
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.3, 202.20.
29. Id. § 202.3.
30. Id.
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Second, the increased volatility in registrations after 1991
illustrated in Charts 2 and 3 may be the result of procedural changes
regarding copyright registrations as well. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, the overall rules regarding the filing of copyright
registrations were dramatically altered as a result of the United
States' accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works and the adoption of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act, both of which went into effect in 1989.31 Among
other things, the Implementation Act eliminated any need for certain
non-U.S. works to file copyright registrations. 32 As such, at least some
of the instability following 1991 may be the result of a reduction in the
number of foreign works seeking copyright protection in the United
States under the Berne Convention. This reduction may have been
caused by a general (albeit possibly erroneous) perception that as a
party to the Berne Convention, all formalities-including copyright
registration-are no longer required to receive copyright protection in
the United States. Once again, while disruptive technologies and
piracy may have depressed the number of new copyrighted works
created after 1991, there are other potential explanations for these
changes.
B. Justification
As discussed above, providing creators with economic
incentives to create new works is one of the principal justifications, if
not the justification, for copyright's expansion. As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted, "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." 33 But what level of incentives is appropriate? Many scholars
have argued that copyright laws need only "provide the owner
sufficient incentives to produce such property," which means
"something less than 'perfect control.' "34 Otherwise, the benefits of
increased copyright protection may be offset by the harms created by

31. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988).
32. Id.
33. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), superseded by Act of
Oct. 19, 1976, ch. 1, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2550, as recognized in Crabshaw Music v. KBob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763, 766 (W.D. Tex. 1990); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996) ("lit is incentive language
that pervades the Supreme Court's copyright jurisprudence .... ).
34. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635,
638 (1996).
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denying the public access to creative works and the opportunity to
create their own works. 35 These scholars have bemoaned the fact that,
36
whether in response to new technologies and economic opportunities
or simply at the behest of copyright stakeholders, 37 Congress
essentially employs "a one way ratchet, increasing the subject matter,
38
scope, and duration of copyright with every amendment."
One reason for this distress among copyright scholars is that
the logic and rhetorical force of the expansionist position is difficult to
dismiss. Expansionists can simply argue that greater copyright
protections lead to greater rewards for creators, which themselves
lead to greater incentives to create new works, ultimately benefiting
the public by providing them more original creations. 39 The natural
extension of this argument is that if a little copyright law is good,
more is always better. As Sara Stadler observed, this argument does

35.

The scholarly debate in this area is extremely rich and deep. Compare PAUL GOLDSTEIN,

COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed., Stanford Univ.

Press 2003); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over
New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001), with JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); NEAL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008); Yochai

Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, An

Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenge of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
519 (1999).
36. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay: How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 61, 64 (2002) (arguing that Congress "appropriately reache[d] out to address new
problems prompted by new technologies, so as to strike a happier balance").
37. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 860-61 (1987) (explaining that copyright stakeholders, not Congress, developed the
language of the Copyright Act of 1976).
38. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002); see also
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of OperatingSoftware, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust,
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 163 (1999) ("Congress has a ratchet for copyright protection
that sends it in only one direction - more for owners of existing copyrights and less for current
and future authors and for the public generally."); David McGowan, Why the First Amendment
Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 282 (2004) ("Many copyright scholars
object to the way Congress deals with their subject. With good reason, they feel Congress wields
a copyright ratchet: terms get longer, and the scope of rights gets wider, but never the reverse.");
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use DoctrineHarms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) ("Legally, then, copyright has been a one-way ratchet,
covering more works and granting more rights for a longer time.").
39. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supranote 1, at 350.
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"tend to the tautological." 40 Nevertheless, it is quite powerful, and it
cannot be dismissed out of hand, especially when one considers that
there is little agreement on what incentives are sufficient to produce
more original works as well as the inherent difficulty in determining
the economically optimal level of copyright protection.
Consider the argument for giving copyright owners the
exclusive right to control derivative works (i.e., works that are based
upon and incorporate an existing work). According to Paul Goldstein,
allowing the copyright owner of the original work to control such uses
should increase the number of new works created because the
"publisher who knows that it can license, and obtain payment for, the
translation, serialization, condensation and motion picture rights for a
novel will invest more in purchasing, producing and marketing the
novel than it would if its returns were limited to revenues from book
sales in the English language."4 1 We are told that this greater
investment will mean increased access not only to the original work
but also to the licensed derivative works. In some cases, the exclusive
right to control derivative works may be important because of high
initial costs for creating the original work or because the ability to
exclusively exploit these alternative sources of revenue allows
investment in so-called "riskier" projects. For example, a motion
picture studio is more likely to invest in both big budget and avantgarde films when it can obtain exclusive rights to downstream revenue
sources of these films-including hotel, cable, satellite, and broadcast
retransmission, DVD sales and rentals, digital downloads, books, and
42
associated merchandising.
Assuming that people are capable of evaluating and are
motivated by the additional incentives provided by the right to control
derivative works, expanding copyright to include the right to control
derivative works sounds reasonable. In fact, as Jessica Litman notes,
when constrained by the assumption that this model accurately
describes how people behave, the answer to the question of "whether
an increase in copyright protection will lead to the production of more
or better works," is always yes, and "there is no good reason why
copyrights should not cover everything and last forever." 43 Framed in
these terms, whether Congress should expand copyright depends upon
how one weighs the relative benefit of additional creative works
40. Sara K Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 435
(2007).
41. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S. 209, 227 (1983).
42. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1217, 1256.
43. Litman, supranote 38, at 344.
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against the costs associated with expanding copyright law. As
illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
in the absence of a compelling justification to do so, courts are not
44
inclined to second-guess Congress under these circumstances.
In Eldred, plaintiffs challenged Congress's decision to extend
45
the length of copyright protection by an additional twenty years.
They argued that the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") passed
in 1998 violated both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times"
prescription and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. 46 In upholding the CTEA, the Supreme Court concluded that
"[t]he CTEA reflects judgments of a kind.., we cannot dismiss as
outside the Legislature's domain."4 7 According to the Court, Congress
"rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage
copyright holders to invest in ... their works" because of the
incentives created by term extension. 48 The Court noted that in
reaching this conclusion, Congress relied upon the testimony of a
number of artists-including Quincy Jones, Bob Dylan, Don Henley,
and Carlos Santana. 49 Congress also heard the testimony of the
Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters and others who expressed the
belief that the CTEA would provide valuable additional incentives to
create. 50 According to the Register, extending copyright could "provide
additional income that would finance the production and publication
51
of new works."
Reminiscent of Macaulay, Justice Breyer argued in dissent that
the CTEA "will not act as an economic spur encouraging authors to
create new works. '52 According to Justice Breyer, "the incentiverelated numbers are far too small for Congress to have concluded
rationally, even with respect to new works, that the extension's
economic-incentive effect could justify the serious expression-related
harms" created by term extension. 53 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Breyer relied upon studies finding that: (1) very few works
survive long enough for term extension to matter (only 2 percent of all
copyrights retain any commercial value after fifty-five to seventy-five
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

537 U.S. 186, 208, 212 (2003).
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 207 n.15.
Id.
Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 257.
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years), and (2) even if it were reasonable for an artist to believe that
her work may be one of those few, the present value to her would
amount to less than seven cents. 54 As such he opined: "What potential
Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a
sum?"5 5 Moreover, even if "somehow, somewhere, some potential
author might be moved by the thought of great-grandchildren
receiving copyright royalties a century hence, so might some potential
author also be moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two
centuries, five centuries, 1,000 years, 'til the End of Time.' "56 In other
words, the logic of this position would not only justify the CTEA; it
would justify perpetual copyrights, rendering the incentive argument
"difficult to square with the Constitution's insistence on 'limited
Times.' 57
Nonetheless, the seven-member majority concluded that
Congress's decision was rational and consistent with the proposition
that it is primarily for Congress to calibrate "rational economic
incentives."5 8 In short, the Supreme Court was unwilling to question
Congress's reliance upon the logic that increasing incentives enlarges
the number of new works created-even when those increases are so
small they could be considered illusory. While logical, this position is
still a theory and-fortunately--one that can be tested.
III. EXISTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Even though copyright has existed and continuously expanded
for hundreds of years, there has been little empirical research done to
test the logic behind copyright's expansion. 59 As Eldred60 illustrates,
copyright's expansion is largely based upon the testimony of those who
would benefit from such an expansion-artists and industry-and the
54. Id. at 254-55.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 256.
58. Id. at 207 n.15.
59. To date, empirical studies in this area have focused primarily upon the commercial
value of copyrighted works and the relationship between piracy and the sale of copyrighted
works. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 507-08 (2007) (noting the "lack of empirical studies with respect to
copyright incentives" and the "range of other potential uses of copyright [that] are largely
ignored"); Matthew J. Baker, Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of
Copyright Protection, 49 J.L. & ECON. 567, 569 (2006) ("Existing empirical work on copyright
protection ... focuses on either the relationship between infringement and copyright protection
or the relationship between production of copyrightable goods or revenue streams and
protection.").
60. 537 U.S. at 186.
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common-sense judgment that even small increases in financial
incentives will lead to more new works. As one of us has argued
elsewhere, this omission may be explained by the fact that the
financial incentives created by copyright traditionally encouraged the
creation and distribution of creative works. 61 Moreover, until the
widespread adoption of digital technology and the global distribution
made possible by the Internet, copyright was considered necessary to
encourage the widespread distribution of creative works-even if
those works would have been created without copyright. 62 Because
these technologies essentially represent a new distribution paradigm
in which the continued enforcement of copyright's exclusivity rights
leads to the under-distribution of creative works, scholars are now
paying attention to the law's role in the creation of creative works.
One analysis conducted by Landes and Posner attempted to
infer the optimal duration of copyrights.63 This study focused
primarily on copyright renewals and the depreciation value of works
in an effort to estimate the expected economic life of copyrighted
works and the impact of term extension upon that value. In
conducting this analysis, the authors also examined the relationship
between five statutory law changes upon total registrations from 1910
to 2000. In their analysis, the authors also considered year-to-year
changes, the impact of copyright registration and renewal fees, the
expected life of the copyright, and annual recreational expenditures.
Relying upon logarithmic models, the authors found statistically
significant year-to-year growth in the rate of copyright registrations
based upon what they concluded to be changes in the "demand for
expressive activities rather than with changes in fees, the law, or
other policy variables." 64 They also found a "negative and highly
significant effect of registration fees" on registrations and observed
that the number of registrations is "highly responsive to expected
65
commercial life of a work."
With respect to legal changes, Landes and Posner found that
only two of the five legal changes examined-the 1976 Copyright Act

61. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The CreativeDestruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 267 (2002) (arguing that copyright was
traditionally "necessary to provide financial incentives for both creation and distribution");
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 564-65 (2003) ("[C]opyright is a legal mechanism for ensuring that
consumers of those works internalize the costs of their creation and distribution.").
62. Ku, supra note 42, at 1251-59.
63. LANDES & POSNER, supranote 13, at 234-49.
64. Id. at 245.
65. Id. at 245-46.
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and 1988 Berne Convention-had statistically significant effects on
registrations. 66 They estimated that the Berne Convention was
associated with approximately a 10 percent increase in registrations. 67
As for the 1976 Copyright Act, the authors initially found that the
legal change reduced the number of registrations by about 14
percent. 68 However, after discounting for a sharp drop in total
registrations the year after the 1976 Act took effect, the authors
estimated a 16 percent increase in registrations associated with the
Act. 69 While their study found that statutory changes regarding term
extension were positively associated with total applications, the
results were statistically insignificant, and the authors concluded that
this was consistent with the fact that the expected commercial life of a
copyrighted work is "much shorter than the copyright term."70 Finally,
the study included year as a time trend variable.7 1 As such, the year
variable would "pick up increases in population, income, wealth, and
education that are positively correlated with time ... ."72 In so doing,
they found that year is positively correlated with registrations.7 3
Two related studies also empirically examined the effect of
changes in copyright law.7 4 In the first of these studies, Baker and
Cunningham examined the impact of copyright law changes by
looking at how quarterly changes to the breadth of copyright affected
the market valuation of business equity from 1985 to 1998. 75 Baker
and Cunningham relied upon U.S. Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court decisions and statutory changes.7 6 The authors constructed a
logarithmic model and found that both statutory changes and court
decisions were associated with an increase in equity returns.7 7 They
also found that statutory changes and Supreme Court decisions had

66. Id. at 247.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 246.
72. Id. at 245.
73. Id.
74. See Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, Court Decisions and Equity
Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection, 49 J.L. & ECON. 567 (measuring how
changes in copyright protection affect the market valuation of firm equity); Matthew J. Baker &
Brendan M. Cunningham, Law and Innovation in Copyright Industries, 6(1) REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 61 (measuring how changes in copyright protection affect total registrations),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436160.
75. Baker & Cunningham, Court Decisions and Equity Markets, supra note 74, at 571.
76. Id. at 567, 571-72.
77. Id. at 567, 582-83.
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larger impacts on firm equity than lower court decisions. 78 Moreover,
Baker and Cunningham discerned that legal changes broadening
copyright protection were associated with increases in firm equity,
while legal changes narrowing copyright protection were associated
with decreases in firm equity. 79 In other words, changes in copyright
law impacted the public's valuation of firms that relied upon copyright
law.
More importantly for this analysis, Baker and Cunningham's
next study examined whether these legal changes impacted quarterly
copyright applications in both the United States and Canada from
1985 to 2005.80 In this analysis, they relied upon a linear model8 l that
included legal changes among other variables-such as the growth
rate of real growth domestic product ("GDP"), the openness of markets
(calculated as exports plus imports divided by GDP), population,
expected and real application fees, the number of Internet subscribers
per thousand, the number of personal computers per thousand, and a
variable capturing the relationship between personal computers and
Internet subscribers.8 2 With respect to statutory changes, the authors
examined the contemporaneous and lagged values of the net number
of statutes broadening copyright protection.8 3 When that variable was
added to the analysis, the authors found "no strong evidence that
statutory changes significantly impact the flow of applications."8 4 With
respect to changes in case law, Baker and Cunningham examined the
contemporaneous and lagged values of the net number of court
decisions broadening copyright.8 5 They found the coefficient on
contemporaneous value of cases to be "small, negative, and
insignificant" even though "copyright applications increase[d] by
approximately 370 one quarter after a high court decision
strengthen[ed] copyright protection."8 6 However, when the authors
examined the impact of changes in the case law utilizing an Ordinary
Least Squares ("OLS") estimator for the United States alone, they
found no statistically significant relationship between any legal
78. Id. at 582-84.
79. Id. at 567, 582-84.
80. Baker & Cunningham, Law and Innovation in Copyright Industries, supra note 74, at
61-63, 67-68.
81. As shown in Chart 3 and our nonparametric regression analyses in Appendix 1, a single
linear model does not fit our data well.
82. Baker & Cunningham, Law and Innovation in Copyright Industries, supra note 74, at
70-74.
83. Id. at 75-76.
84. Id. at 76.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id.
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changes and copyright applications.8 7 Furthermore, like Landes and
Posner, Baker and Cunningham also found that increases in
application fees were associated with a decrease in copyright
88
applications.
In the other study to examine changes in copyright law using
empirical methods, Png and Wang examined the relationship between
copyright duration and the production of motion pictures.8 9 In that
study, the authors examined the number of movies produced in
twenty-six countries, nineteen of which extended the length of
copyright protection from the author's life plus fifty years to the
author's life plus seventy years at various times between 1991 and
2002.90 The authors constructed an OLS regression model with the
dependent variable as the number of movies produced in that country
per year based upon information available in the Internet Movie
Database. 91 The authors also included other independent variables in
the regression, such as changes to copyright duration, GDP per capita,
92
population, a time trend, country fixed effects, and copyright piracy.
Based upon their analysis, Png and Wang concluded that extending
the term of copyright was associated with a statistically significant
increase in movie production and that the increase was higher in
93
countries where piracy was lower.
Accordingly, the existing efforts to examine the question of
whether copyright law promotes creativity have been limited in scope.
Landes and Posner examined only five legal changes. Baker and
Cunningham examined only a twenty-year time period. Moreover,
both of these studies examined the impact of legal changes upon total
registrations-a number that includes copyright renewals-rather
than for each separate category of work. The studies treat
registrations as essentially the same despite the 1988 Berne
Implementation Act and other major changes to copyright registration
rules. As discussed below, the parameters of these studies leave open
the possibility that the statistical models do not fully capture the
relationship between law and the development of creative works.
While Png and Wang avoided the difficulties of conflating
registrations and renewals by relying upon the Internet Movie
87.
88.
89.
1 (Sept.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 76, 80.
Ivan P.L. Png & Qiu-Hong Wang, Copyright Duration and the Supply of Creative Work
2006), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=932161.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-12.
Id. at 3.
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Database, their study is limited to motion pictures and copyright term
extension. Moreover, the authors themselves admitted that their
findings were contrary to the received wisdom as evidenced in part by
the studies conducted by Landes and Posner and Baker and
Cunningham. 94 Consequently, the relationship between changes in
copyright law and the creation of new works demands further
analysis.
IV. OUR STUDY
A. Methodology
To examine the relationship between law and human
creativity, we used U.S. copyright registrations as the dependent
variable and as a proxy for new works created in a given year. These
registrations are published annually by the U.S. Copyright Office and
are available by subject matter from 1870 to the present. 95 Copyright
registrations are merely proxies for works of authorship such as
stories, poems, songs, pictures, and videos for two basic reasons. First,
registration is not a prerequisite for obtaining copyright protection.
Accordingly, authors who may intend to protect their works under
copyright law may nonetheless choose not to register their works.
Registration is not a costless process, and the registration fee itselfcurrently $65 for paper filing and $35 for electronic filing-may deter
individuals from filing a registration. 96 Second, not all authors create
with the intention or even the aspiration to prevent others from
copying their work. As such, there is a large and unknown number of
creative works that exist entirely outside of copyright law and are not
represented by copyright registrations.
Nonetheless, copyright registrations are useful proxies for this
analysis for two reasons. First, while registration is not required to
have one's work fall under the auspices of copyright law, registration
has its advantages. The most important of these is that until 1989,
registration was a prerequisite to filing a copyright infringement
lawsuit. 97 Specifically, registration was required before the alleged

94.

Id. at 3-5.

95. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 23, THE COPYRIGHT CARD CATALOGUE AND
THE ONLINE FILES OF THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE 3, 4 (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/

circs/circ23.pdf (describing access to copyright office records by date and subject matter).
96. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 4, COPYRIGHT OFFICE FEES 6 (2009), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ04.pdf.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
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infringement or within three months of first publication.9 8 As such,
until 1989 anyone hoping to preserve a legal remedy for copyright
infringement was required to register. This rule still applies for U.S.
works.9 9 Timely registration is also required if the copyright owner
wishes to seek statutory damages or attorney's fees.10 0 Otherwise, the
copyright owner is limited to actual damages, which in some instances
are not worth the cost of litigation. A certificate of registration also
serves as prima facie evidence both that the copyrighted work is
original and that the facts stated in the certificate are true. 10 1
Registration also entitles the owner to file with the U.S. Customs
Service for protection against infringing imports. 102
Second, while registered works do not encompass the entire
universe of creative works, they represent the authors and types of
works that should be most sensitive to changes in copyright law. In
other words, while there are authors who may not be concerned with
copyright law-that is, whose behavior may not be affected by changes
in the law-those interested in benefiting from the full scope of
copyright law and those at the margin (whose decisions would be
influenced by changes to copyright law) should be represented by
those who register their works. In short, registrants care about
copyright. Consequently, if there is a group of authors or investors
that would be especially responsive to changes in copyright law, it
should be those who register.103
For the purposes of this study, we examined individual
categories of copyright registrations rather than total registrations.
Total registrations are unreliable because variations in aggregate
copyright registrations may be influenced by changes unrelated to the
scope of copyright protection. For example, the total number of
registrations is influenced by the addition of new categories of
copyrighted works, such as the addition of motion pictures, sound
recordings, and computer programs. Total registrations also include
98.

Id.

§§ 408-412; see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,

NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT § 7.16 (2009) (discussing the significance of registration as a condition to an
infringement action).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
100. Id. § 412.
101. Id. § 410.
102. Id. § 602(b).
103. This is not to say that other authors would not be concerned or impacted by copyright
law. To the extent that Congress and courts expand the scope of copyright, even authors who do
not seek copyright protection for their own works-either because they do not wish to
commercially exploit those works or because they do not desire to exclude others from using
those works-are and should be concerned because they may be the targets of copyright
litigation to the extent that their works are based upon, use, or even reference other works.
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renewal registrations, which do not represent new works and also
reflect the subsequent elimination of the requirement to file renewal
registrations for works subject to dual copyright terms. While we
collected data and analyzed every category of copyrighted work
collected by the copyright office, this Article reports our results for six
categories of copyright registrations-monographs, serials, performing
arts,1 04 visual arts, 1 5 sound recordings, and motion pictures. We
report these six categories because our findings with regard to these
categories are representative of the broad range of copyright works.
With respect to performing arts and visual arts, a change in
how the Copyright Office categorized registrations forced us to
combine formerly separate categories of works. In 1978, the Copyright
Office grouped several previously separate categories-including
motion pictures, musical compositions, and sculptures-into the
broader categories of performing arts and visual arts. As such, we
were unable to obtain specific registration numbers for individual
works such as motion pictures because they are now subsumed into
the broader categories. Nevertheless, we decided in favor of analyzing
the umbrella categories in order to examine the influence of our
independent variables over a longer period of time. However, because
we are using umbrella categories, they are not entirely immune from
changes brought about by the addition of new subcategories of works.
As a reliability check, we report motion pictures separately, though we
do so for a shorter time period.
Moreover, because the Berne Implementation Act changed the
importance of registering non-U.S. works, we divided our analysis into
two time periods, each of which represents a separate registration
regime. In addition to the actual legal change, the choice of 1989 as
the relevant demarcation was confirmed by a statistical change point
analysis that tests the existence of change points and estimates the
locations of any that exist. Accordingly, with respect to monographs,
serials, performing arts, and visual arts we examined the impact of
the independent variables in two separate time periods: 1870 to 1989
and 1989 to 2006. This separate analysis allowed us to distinguish

104. The Copyright Office defines "performing arts works" as works intended to be
"performed" directly before an audience or indirectly "by means of any device or process."
Included are "(1) musical works, including any accompanying words; (2) dramatic works, such as
scripts, including any accompanying music; (3) pantomimes and choreographic works; and (4)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works." U.S. Copyright Office, Form PA (2006), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/forms/formgr-pa.pdf.
105. The Copyright Office defines visual arts as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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between changes in registration rules and changes due to the scope of
copyright.
In order to determine whether changes in copyright
registration were influenced by changes in copyright law, we compiled
a table of both legislative enactments and Supreme Court decisions
that altered copyright protection. These include the recognition of new
rights (including the right to control derivative works), new penalties
(like the addition of criminal liability), and increases in copyright
terms. These legal changes are listed by year in Appendix 2. We chose
not to include lower court decisions for several reasons. 10 6 First, such
decisions are generally limited in their geographical reach. Second, we
considered it unlikely that individuals beyond the parties themselves
would be sufficiently aware of such decisions for such decisions to
influence their behavior. Third, the relative number and frequency of
such decisions per year create dimensionality issues that mask the
important factors like major legal changes or other variables that
change each year. In addition to legal changes, we simultaneously
examined other independent variables, including changes in copyright
registration fees, population, 10 7 real GDP (to measure the size of the
economy), and technological milestones. The list of technological
milestones by year appears in Appendix 3. With respect to legal
changes and technological milestones, we considered their
contemporaneous and lagged associations for one, two, and three
years. Ultimately, after testing one-, two-, and three-year lags, we
concluded that a one-year lag more accurately reflected the time frame
in which a would-be registrant would respond to these changes.
In our statistical analyses, we found many legal and technology
variables (coded as dummy variables) to be statistically insignificant
and therefore nuisance covariates. Too many nuisance covariates may
crowd out statistical significance.10 8 To see how this large number of
106. We did include one circuit court decision, Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d.
Cir. 1930), in this framework because of its overall importance to copyright doctrine.
107. Actually, we also considered the time trend, i.e. the year variable in our study, as
Landes and Poser did. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13. However, it was obvious from the
data that the population size and the year had almost a perfect linear relationship except for a
tiny dent around 1940 corresponding to World War II. Hence the population and year variables
are statistically multi-collinear and only one of them should be entered in a sensible regression
analysis. We therefore retained population in our study since it makes more sense as an
independent variable, but will be mindful about the association of population and year in our
interpretation of statistical results.
108. Peng Liu, Jiayang Sun, & Zhongfa Zhang, SPCA - A New Feature Selection Procedure
for Large-p Data, in 2007 PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON
STATISTICAL COMPUTING (American Statistical Association CD-ROM); Debashis Paul, Eric Bair,
Trevor Hastie, & Robert Tibshirani, Preconditioningfor Feature Selection and Regression in
High-dimensionalProblems, 36 ANNALS STAT. 1595-1618 (2008).
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dummy variables was affecting our results, we conducted simulation
experiments to observe the effects of the legal and technology nuisance
dummy variables (coded as "1" continuously after a year from its onset
time) as the number of the dummy variables increased. For the models
that are similar to ours in sample size, dimension, and structure, the
truly significant dummy variables were found extremely significant,
while some nuisance dummy variables were slightly significant (i.e.,
with p-values less than 0.05 but quite bigger than those truly
significant ones) or marginally significant (i.e., with a p-value between
0.05 and 0.15). This confirms that our analyses are conservative (i.e.,
the significant variables will be found significant) and that most legal
changes do not have their expected outcomes because the legal
variables found to be significant in our study (including the
marginally significant ones) only constitute a subset of all legal and
technology changes.
Finally, in conducting our analysis we considered three
statistical models in each of the time periods separated by the change
point 1989:109 general linear, logarithmic linear, and nonparametric. 110
For both the linear and logarithmic linear models, we were able to
code legal changes and technological milestones as standard dummy
variables, and as discussed above, we considered the contemporaneous
and lagged association between these variables and copyright
registrations. For our multiple regression analysis, the logarithmic
model represented the closest fit. For the nonparametric model, we
relied upon our calculated simultaneous confidence bounds of
registration as a function of population as well as legal changes that
expanded and decreased the scope of copyright protection. While the
nonparametric model does not suffer a possible model misspecification
like the parametric model and provides the best fit with regard to the
relationship between copyright registrations and population, the
relationship between legal changes and creativity is comparable
across all three models. Moreover, the parametric model is easier to
interpret. Between the two parametric models, our fitted logarithmic
linear model is closer to the nonparametric fit than the linear model.
Thus, the findings reported below are based upon the best logarithmic
linear model.

109. We reiterate here the importance of analyzing the monograph, serials, performing arts,
visual arts, and sound recording registration data in two separate time periods, pre- and post1989.
110. A detailed discussion of our statistical methodology is attached as Appendix 1.
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B. Findings
This study tested two hypotheses. The major hypothesis is that
legal changes in copyright protection will affect the number of works
produced. The minor hypothesis focuses upon the relationship
between these changes: increasing copyright protection will increase
the number of works produced, and decreasing copyright protection
will reduce the number of works produced at least until an optimal
level of copyright protection is reached. As we demonstrate below, we
found little empirical support for either the major or minor hypothesis.
While we find found significant association between some individual
legal changes and certain categories of works, many did not have any
association. Hence the significance of an association is not predictable
or uniform across legal changes or across works as predicted by the
major hypothesis. With respect to the minor hypothesis, there was no
consistent directional relationship between the number of works
registered and the legal changes associated with subsequent changes
in copyright registrations, as predicted by advocates of expansive
copyright law. This conclusion held true not only for individual legal
changes but for categories of legal changes as well-including
extending the length of copyright protection, increasing civil and
criminal penalties, changing the subject matter of copyright, and
generally restricting copyright. Instead, we found that the number of
works produced is mainly a function of population, and-in the case of
monographs and serials-a function of the economy as well.
Chart 4 graphically illustrates the results of our multiple
regression analysis based upon an "optimal" log-transformed model.1 1 1
The coefficients have been transformed back into the individual legal
changes' percentage influences on registrations by category. In other
words, this chart illustrates the estimated influence of each legal
change in consideration of the concurrent influences of other
variables, including changes induced by other laws and non-legal
factors like population, the economy, and registration fees. Years in
which there are no bars represent legal changes that did not yield a
statistically significant relationship with any of the categories of
works we studied. The years in bold are those in which the legal
change limited or reduced copyright protection, and the years in bold

111. The nonparametric results for each of the categories as well as for overall registrations
can be found in Appendix 1. We also created linear and quadratic models, but concluded that the
log-transformed model was the best fitting parametric model.
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and underlined represent years in which legal changes both increased
112
and decreased copyright protection.
CHART 4. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION CAUSED
BY LEGAL CHANGES
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112. For the purposes of this analysis, we did not include two changes in registration
associated with the 1870 legal change. These associations were so high-a 100 percent reduction
in the case of serials-that we considered them to be an unreliable byproduct of being so closely
associated with the starting/intercept point for the model.
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1. By Work
With regard to books registered between 1870 and 1989, we
found that only six legal changes out of a possible twenty-nine had a
statistically significant connection to changes in the number of works
subsequently registered. 113 In other words, 21 percent of the legal
changes during this time period significantly contributed to changes in
the number of new works. From 1989 to 2006, our research revealed
that only five legal changes out of a possible thirteen (46 percent) had
a statistically significant contribution. 1 14 Overall, 29 percent of legal
changes bore a measurable contribution to the number of new books
created when all other possible influential factors were taken into
consideration. Registrations fees did not have a statistically
significant association in either time period. In addition to these legal
changes, population and GDP were statistically significant
influences-with population as the most dominant variable. Growth in
population was consistently associated with increases in the number
of new books. Meanwhile, growth in GDP was positively associated
with new books registered between 1870 and 1989, but it was
negatively associated after 1989. This indicates that the Berne
Implementation Act had a profound influence on registrations after
1989.115
The largest increase in book registrations (35 percent increase)
was associated with the 1997 No Electronic Theft Act, which provided
for criminal liability even when the infringer did not seek financial
gain. That Act was passed in response the electronic distribution of
computer software, which could be registered as a monograph. It was
followed closely by the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
That case, which upheld Congress's decision to increase the length of
copyright protection, provided the second-largest increase in book
registrations (34 percent increase). The largest decrease of monograph
registrations (27 percent decrease) was associated with three legal
changes occurring in 1990: the Visual Artists Rights Act, the

113. App. 1, tbl.1.
114. App. 1, tbl.2.
115. The negative value is the contribution of GDP to the remaining unexplained variationin
the number of registered works after the contributions by other factors have been counted.
Indeed, as shown by the data, population and GDP were positively correlated. The growth in
each, when each acted alone, would have positive association with the growth of new works.
However, population and GDP did not grow in isolation. When the contribution or association of
population had been counted, the contribution of GDP to registered works had already been
partially counted; the coefficient for the GDP provided an additional contribution or association
(if it had the same sign as the simple regression) or an adjustment (if it had a different sign) to
what is already explained by other factors.
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Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, and the Supreme
116
Court's decision regarding copyright renewal in Stewart v. Abend.
The next largest decline in book registrations (26 percent decrease)
was associated with the 1909 Act. 117 With thirteen associated legal
changes, books were the most sensitive category of copyrighted works
in our study.
With regard to serials, we found statistically significant
associations between population, GDP, and registration fees and
subsequent serial registrations-though the direction of these
associations varied. From 1870 to 1989, population growth was
associated with an increase in the number of new serials," 8 but from
1989 to 2006, the regression coefficient for population was negative as
an adjustment factor." 9 The regression coefficient for GDP was
negative from 1870 to 1989 but had no statistically significant
relationship after 1989. Registration fees were negatively associated
with the number of registrations before 1989, but they had no
statistically significant relationship after 1989. From 1870 to 1989, we
found seven out of a possible twenty-nine legal changes (24 percent) to
have a statistically significant connection to the number of works
subsequently registered. From 1989 to 2006, we found three legal
changes out of a possible thirteen (23 percent) to have such a
relationship.
The two largest increases to serial registrations (30 percent
increases) were associated with legal changes in 1994 and 2003. The
year 1994 included both an international agreement extending
copyright to protect live musical performances as well as a U.S.
Supreme Court decision recognizing parody as a potential fair use of
copyrighted works. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
extension of the length of copyright protection. The largest decrease in
serial registrations (18 percent decrease) followed the Second Circuit's
decision in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., which recognized the
120
importance of protecting copyrighted works beyond literal copying.
These results reaffirm our theory that the Berne Implementation Act
made a sharp change that either slowed down the increase of
registered works or actually made the number of registrations
decrease. The effects of significant legal changes both before and after
116. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 et seq.; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
117. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35. Stat. 1075 (1970) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-805 (2006)).
118. App. 1, tbl.3.
119. App. 1, tbl.4.
120. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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1989 on the number of copyright registrations are tiny in comparison
to the effects of the population or the time trend.
With regard to the performing arts, between 1870 and 1989, we
found that ten legal changes out of a possible twenty-nine (34 percent)
had a statistically significant relationship to the number of new works
subsequently registered, 121 and one legal change out of a potential
thirteen (8 percent) had a statistically significant association between
1989 and 2006.122 Overall, a little more than one-in-four legal changes
were related to the number of new works of performing arts
registered. Population was an important-if not the dominantvariable before 1989, although it had no measurable relationship after
1989. GDP and registration fees were not statistically relevant in
either time period. The largest increase of performing arts
registrations (33 percent increase) was associated with the Supreme
Court's 1879 decision limiting copyright to the protection of expression
and not ideas. 123 The next two largest increases of performing arts
registrations (24 percent increases) were associated with the extension
of recording and performing rights to non-dramatic literary works in
1952 and with the United States' joining the Berne Convention and
the Satellite Home Viewing Act in 1988. Decreases in performing arts
registrations were associated with the protection of motion pictures in
1912 (13 percent decrease) and the Supreme Court's decision requiring
copyrighted works to have at least a minimal degree of creativity (24
124
percent decrease).
While motion pictures are generally treated as a subcategory of
performing arts due to the Copyright Office's registration policies, we
obtained motion picture-specific data between 1913 and 1983. During
that time period, we found three out of fifteen legal changes (20
percent) had a statistically significant relationship to new copyright
registrations. 125 Motion picture registrations were also positively
associated with growth in population and negatively correlated with
increases in registration fees. The 1930 legal change in Nichols 126 was
associated with a 31 percent decrease in registrations, the largest
decrease in our study. The 1971 legal change was the largest increase
in registrations in our study; it was associated with a 47 percent
increase in motion picture registrations. In that year, the United

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

App. 1, tbl.5.
App. 1, tbl.6.
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91-99 (1879).
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
App. 1, tbl.7.
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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States protected sound recordings and participated in the revision of
strengthened
which
Convention,
Copyright
Universal
the
international protection for copyrighted works. The Copyright Act of
1976 was associated with a 28 percent increase in motion picture
registrations. 127
Finally, with regard to sound recordings, which only became
eligible for copyright protection in 1972, we found four out of twentytwo legal changes (14 percent) had a statistically significant
association with subsequent sound recording registrations through
2006.128 Two of these occurred before 1989, and two occurred after
1989. Population was positively associated with new sound recordings
before 1989, but it was not statistically relevant afterwards.
Registration fees were positively associated with sound recording
registrations before 1989, but they were not statistically relevant
afterwards. GDP was not statistically relevant in either time period.
The Supreme Court's decision upholding Congress's increase of the
length of copyright protection 129 was associated with the largest
increase in sound recording registrations (36 percent increase).
Congress's increase of criminal penalties 130 was associated with the
second-largest increase in sound recording registrations (33 percent
increase). The year including the passage of both the Copyright Term
131
Extension Act ("CTEA") and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") was associated with a 23 percent increase in sound
recording registrations. Both the Berne Implementation Act and the
Satellite Home Viewer Act were associated with an 18 percent
decrease in sound recording registrations. Both motion pictures and
sound recordings appeared to be less sensitive to legal changes than
32
the other works in this study.

127. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2006)).
128. App. 1, tbls.8-9.
129. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
130. Prioritizing Resources & Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO-IP) Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15, 17, 18, 19, 42

U.S.C.).
131. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (Copyright Term Extension Act) (CTEA),
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998); Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
132. Because the distribution of visual arts registrations did not fit a parametric model (i.e.,
linear, quadratic, or log transformed), we did not conduct a multiple regression analysis
measuring the association between legal changes and technological milestones upon those
registrations using those models. Our nonparametric results suggest that following an initial
bump in registrations most likely due to the practice of copyrighting individual frames of motion
pictures, which was common until motion pictures were entitled to their own separate protection,
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2. Across Categories
The lack of consistency and uniformity between changes in
copyright law and copyright registrations also exists when legal
changes are considered across categories. Overall, the relationship
between legal changes and new registrations increased when we
examined whether a legal change was associated with at least one
category of work. Twenty-four out of forty-two legal changes had at
least one such association. In other words, a little more than half of all
legal changes had a statistically significant association with a
subsequent change in copyright registrations. However, these
associations occurred 24 percent of the time when all of the individual
categories of works were considered. 133 Of those relationships, twentyseven were positive and thirteen negative. Given these results, legal
changes have been historically associated with an increase in at least
one category of registrations 41 percent of the time. This number fell
to 38 percent when only laws expanding copyright protection were
considered. Not a single legal change between 1870 and 2006 had a
statistically significant association across all of the categories studied.

visual art registrations are consistent with the other categories in this study, with population
being the most important variable. See App. 1.
133. Some may question this analysis because the denominator includes all of the categories
of works in our study. In some cases, we may not expect a relationship as a legal change may be
directed towards a specific category of work, such as the addition of motion pictures as a category
of protected work, treating computer software as literary works, or the regulation of live musical
performances. One might suggest that such legal changes should not influence other creative
works. I would like to thank Justin Hughes for raising this point. We chose not to limit our
analysis on the assumption that category-specific legal changes should only be analyzed for that
category. First, it is possible that changes in protection for one kind of work may impact the
investment and time spent on other works. If so, we wanted to be able to examine that crossover
effect. Consider the 1912 addition of motion pictures to the category of works protected by
copyright. One might argue that we should limit our analysis of that legal change to motion
picture registrations because it is only directly relevant to motion pictures. However, this
position ignores the fact that changes with regard to one type of creative work may have indirect
consequences, both positive and negative, for other copyrighted works. For example, protecting
motion pictures may very well encourage more people to write books and short stories let alone
screenplays to provide the story for motion pictures. Moreover, the advent of sound in motion
pictures may encourage people to write and perform more music. However, the addition of
motion pictures may also hurt music and other performing arts by competing for the public's
limited time and dollars. Second, a more narrow focus would ignore the signaling aspects of legal
changes. In other words, a song writer may be encouraged to write more songs as a result of
Congress's decision to protect motion pictures because it signals the importance of copyright in
general, or simply because the songwriter might expect similar favorable treatment in the
future. If we had limited our analysis to motion pictures, we would have missed the statistically
significant association with books, serials, and works of performing arts.
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3. By Type of Legal Change
When we organized legal changes into subcategories, a slightly
different picture appeared. We grouped legal changes into those that
increased the length of copyright protection, expanded the subject
matter capable of being copyrighted, recognized new rights for
copyrighted works, increased civil and criminal penalties, and reduced
or otherwise limited copyright protection. Because our variable for
legal change was the year in which the change occurred, we were
unable to isolate the effects of any given legal change when more than
one change occurred in a year. As such, when different subcategories
of legal changes occurred in the same year, we added that year to each
subcategory.
CHART 5. LAWS INCREASING LENGTH OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Effect of Increased Length of Copyright Protection on Registrations
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Of the eight laws changing the length of copyright protection,
four (50 percent) had a statistically significant relationship with at
least one category of creative works. Two of those legal changes were
the major revisions of copyright law in 1909 and 1976, which did more
than just increase the length of copyright protection. When all
categories of registrations are considered, term changes impacted
registrations 31 percent of the time. The 1909 Act was associated with
a 26 percent reduction in book registrations. The 1976 Act was
associated with a 10 percent increase in performing arts, 10 percent
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increase in serials, and 28 percent increase in motion pictures
registrations. The CTEA, passed the same year as the DMCA, 134 was
associated with a 27 percent increase in monograph, 15 percent
increase in serial, and 23 percent increase in sound recording
registrations. The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Eldred13 5 was
associated with a 34 percent increase in monograph, 30 percent
increase in serial, and 36 percent increase in sound recording
registrations. Accordingly, laws increasing copyright protection had a
45 percent probability of increasing registrations in at least one
category and a 5 percent probability of decreasing registrations in at
least one category.
CHART 6. LAWs GRANTING NEW RIGHTS
Effect of Laws Granting New Rights on Registrations
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Of the fifteen laws that increased the legal rights available to
copyright owners, such as the right to control derivative works or to
publicly display works, ten were associated with changes in
registrations for at least one category of work. 136 In other words, 67
percent of legal changes that gave copyright owners a new right had a
statistically significant association with at least one category of work.
This figured dropped to 27 percent when all categories were

134. 112 Stat. 2827; 112 Stat. 2860.
135. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
136. Again, we excluded the 1870 revision.
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considered. Of the sixteen instances in which a statistically significant
association was found, thirteen were positive and three were negative.
Every category of creative works exhibited at least one association
with laws expanding the legal rights available under copyright. For
motion pictures, the 1976 Act was associated with a 28 percent
increase in registrations. For sound recordings, the CTEA and DMCA
were associated with a 23 percent increase in registrations, and the
Berne Implementation Act and Satellite Home Viewer Act 13 7 were
associated with an 18 percent decrease in registrations. For books, the
1909 Act was associated with a 26 percent decrease in registrations,
and the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") and Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act ("AWCPA") were associated with a 27
percent decrease in registrations.
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act was
associated with a 22 percent increase in book registrations, and the
CTEA and DMCA in 1998 were associated with a 27 percent increase.
For performing arts, all five associations were positive. The Act of
1897 was associated with a 15 percent increase, the Act of 1952 a 24
percent increase, and the 1976 Act a 10 percent increase. A cluster of
legal changes in 1984, including the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act, Record Rental Amendment, and the Supreme Court's decision in
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,138 was associated with a 10
percent increase. The 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act and
Satellite Home Viewer Act were associated with a 24 percent increase.
Overall, laws granting copyright owners new rights over their works
had a 54 percent probability of increasing registrations in at least one
category of work, and they had a 13 percent probability of decreasing
registrations.

137. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); Satellite
Home Viewer Act, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988).
138. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2006); Record Rental
Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (2006) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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CHART 7. LAwS INCREASING CIVIL/CRIMINAL PENALTIES
Effect of Laws Increasing Civil/Criminal Penalties an Registrations
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Six laws changed criminal or civil penalties, all of which
created or increased penalties during the period of this study. Four of
these legal changes (67 percent) correlated with at least one change in
subsequent copyright registrations. However, laws increasing criminal
penalties were only associated with changes in copyright registrations
six out of twenty-three times (26 percent) with regard to all creative
works studied. These legal changes were associated with increases in
registrations in four instances: performing arts (15 percent increase),
monographs twice (14 percent and 35 percent increases), and sound
recordings (33 percent increase). These legal changes were also
associated with two decreases in registrations for monographs (26
percent decrease) and serials (10 percent decrease). The 1982 legal
change was the only one that exclusively addressed penalties, and it
was associated with a change in registrations of three categories of
works: books (14 percent increase), serials (10 percent decrease), and
sound recordings (33 percent increase). Motion picture registrations
did not exhibit any statistically significant relationship with laws
increasing criminal or civil penalties. Given these results, laws
increasing copyright penalties had a 44 percent probability of
increasing at least one type of registration, and they had a 22 percent
chance of decreasing at least one category of registrations.
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CHART 8. LAws EXPANDING COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Effect of Laws Expanding Copyrightable Subject Matter on Registrations
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During the time period of this study, eight laws expanded the
subject matter of copyright by enlarging the kinds of expression
eligible for copyright protection. 139 Six of these laws (75 percent) were
associated with a change in registrations in at least one category of
work. 140 Subject matter legal changes affected the number of
registrations of all creative works nine times out of thirty-three (27
percent). These nine changes were almost evenly split between five
positive and six negative associations. The 1971 legal changes,
protecting sound recordings and revising the Universal Copyright
Convention, 141 produced the largest change in registrations in this
category: a 47 percent increase in motion picture registrations.
Monograph registrations also saw an increase df 6 percent associated
with the 1971 changes. Monographs exhibited the largest decrease in
registrations in the category. They witnessed a 27 percent decrease
associated with the legal changes in 1990: VARA, AWCPA, and
Stewart v. Abend.1 42 The Supreme Court's decision protecting

139. The 1870 revision would fall under this category, but once again, we are excluding it for
statistical purposes.
140. App. 1, tbl.16.
141. SeeApp. 1, tbl.17.
142. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (2006);
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133
(2006); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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advertisements based upon the principle of nondiscrimination 143 was
associated with a 12 percent decrease in serial registrations. The
extension of copyright to protect motion pictures resulted in a 5
percent increase in monograph registrations and a 13 percent decrease
in performing arts registrations. Counterintuitively, the 1980 legal
change-protecting computer software as a literary work144-- was
associated with a 7 percent decrease in the registration of
monographs. Moreover, the protection of semiconductor chips, the
regulation of record rentals, and the Supreme Court's 1984 Betamax
decision 14 5 were associated with a 9 percent increase in serial and 10
percent increase in performing arts registrations. As a category, only
sound recordings did not exhibit any relationship with laws expanding
copyrightable subject matter. According to the data, there was a 42
percent probability that a law expanding the subject matter of
copyright would increase registrations, and a 50 percent probability it
would decrease registrations.
CHART 9. LAws LIMITING OR REDUCING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Effect of Limiting or Reducing Copyright Protection on Registrations
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143. Stewart, 495 U.S. 207.
144. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006)).
145. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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The most consistently positive associations were found with
laws that reduced or otherwise limited copyright protection. 146 Of the
seven legal changes that reduced or otherwise limited copyright
protection, five (71 percent) were associated with changes in
registration for at least one category of creative works. When the
relationship between these legal changes was considered with respect
to all categories, in seven out of a possible twenty-seven cases (26
percent) these laws had an effect. Six of those associations led to
increases in registrations, and only one led to a decrease. The
Supreme Court's seminal decision in 1879 establishing the
idea/expression dichotomy 147 was associated with a 12 percent
increase in serial registrations and a 33 percent increase in
performing arts registrations. The Court's affirmance of a lower
court's conclusion that photocopying scientific journal articles was fair
use1 48 was associated with a 15 percent increase in performing arts
registrations. The protection of semiconductor chips, the regulation of
record rentals, and the Court's 1984 Betamax 49 decision were
associated with a 9 percent increase in serial and 10 percent increase
in performing arts registrations. The Court's 1991 decision requiring a
minimal degree of creativity for a work to be protected under
copyright 1 0 accounted for the only decrease in registrations: a 24
percent decrease in performing arts registrations. The 1994 law
providing protection of live musical performances and the Court's
decision recognizing parody as fair use 151 were associated with a 30
percent increase in the registration of serials. Book, motion picture,
and sound recording registrations exhibited no associations with these
legal changes. Given these associations, there was a 61 percent chance
that a law decreasing copyright protection would increase copyright
registrations, and a 10 percent chance it would decrease registrations.

146. App. 1, tbl.17.
147. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
148. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
149. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. 417.
150. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
151. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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If we excluded the 1964 preemption decisions and Feist,152 the
153
percentages respectively changed to 80 percent and zero.
C. Does Law Inspire Creativity?
What develops from the data is a complex picture of the
relationship between changes in copyright law and the registration of
new works. At the very least, our findings cast serious doubt on the
idea that, with copyright law, one size fits all.1 54 In other words, there
is little support for the broad proposition that one may expect changes
in copyright law to have a predictable and uniform effect across all
creative works, whether those works are books, sound recordings, or
musical compositions. Even interpreted in the light most favorable to
our hypotheses, the evidence suggests that it is at best slightly better
than a coin toss whether a legal change will have any effect upon a
single category of creative works. The data indicate that one cannot
reliably predict ex ante whether a legal change will have a positive or
negative effect on the number of new works produced. In many
instances, the same legal change is associated with an increase in
registrations in one category and a decrease in another without any
apparent substantive reason for the different outcomes. Moreover, our
data suggest that laws increasing copyright protection and laws
reducing copyright protection are both likely to be positively
associated with changes in the number of new works registered.
The study demonstrates that the categories of copyrighted
works differ in sensitivity to legal changes. Monographs, with twelve
152. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (finding that a work must contain "some minimal degree of
creativity" in order to qualify for copyright protection); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 228 (1964) (holding that federal patent law is "one of the enumerated powers of
Congress"); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) (holding that
state law may not act to prevent copying of an article that is unprotected by federal patent or
copyright).
153. The 1964 legal changes involved two Supreme Court decisions addressing the federal
preemption of state law with regard to intellectual property claims. See Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S.
225; Compco, 376 U.S 234. Even though these decisions have implications for copyrights because
they specifically involved patent law, the lack of association with copyright registrations may not
be unexpected. Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Feist differs from the other laws in this
category because it does not decrease copyright protection allowing others to create new works
outside the original copyright owner's control. Instead, it categorically denies protection for
works lacking sufficient creativity, and could be considered sufficiently different in kind to justify
separate treatment.
154. See Ku, supra note 42, at 1251-59 (arguing that incentives must be evaluated by the
specific creative endeavor); see also Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity of
Cost in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846-47 (2006); Lydia Pallas Loren, The
Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape
Copyright Protection,69 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).
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associations, were the most sensitive. Performing arts had eleven
associations; serials had ten associations. In contrast, both motion
pictures and sound recordings-with three and four associations
respectively-appeared less sensitive to legal changes, though these
associations were also over a shorter time period than the other
categories.
Our study also illustrates the varying likely outcomes based
upon the type of legal change. Increasing the length of copyright
protection has a 45 percent chance of increasing copyright
registrations, and expanding the subject matter protected by copyright
has a 42 percent chance of increasing registrations. Granting
copyright owners new rights over their works has a 54 percent chance
of increasing copyright registrations, while creating or increasing
penalties for copyright infringement has a 67 percent chance. In
contrast, laws decreasing or limiting copyright protection have either
a 61 or an 80 percent chance of increasing copyright registrations,
depending upon which legal changes are included in this category.
While laws increasing the length of copyright protection are
less likely to increase registrations, they are also the least likely to
decrease registrations (5 percent of the time). There is a 13 percent
probability that increasing rights will decrease registrations, a 22
percent probability
that increasing penalties will decrease
registrations, and a 50 percent probability that expanding
copyrightable subject matter will decrease registrations. With regard
to laws decreasing copyright protection, there is either 10 percent
possibility or none that such laws will decrease registrations,
depending upon what legal changes are included in this category.
These results indicate that laws increasing copyright terms are nine
times more likely to increase registrations than to decrease them.
Laws expanding rights are four times more likely to increase than
decrease registrations. Increasing penalties is twice as likely to
increase registrations than decrease them. However, expanding the
subject matter of copyright is more likely to decrease registrations
than to increase them. Lastly, decreasing copyright protection is at
least six times more likely to increase registrations.
From an institutional perspective, there is very little difference
between the sources of the legal change. Federal statutes are slightly
more likely to be associated with a change in registrations than are
Supreme Court decisions. Sixty-one percent of the federal statutes in
our study were associated with at least one change in registration,
compared to fifty-eight percent of Supreme Court decisions. Likewise
federal statutes were slightly more consistent: they exhibited a 26
percent association across all categories, compared to 22 percent for
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Supreme Court decisions. These figures include years in which the
Supreme Court and Congress were both responsible for legal changes.
When those mixed years are excluded, Supreme Court decisions were
associated with changes in the number of registrations in at least one
category 57 percent of the time and across all categories 23 percent of
the time. The corresponding results for statutes were 61 and 27
percent.
In addition to these general observations, four more tentative
observations may be made with regard to three types of legal changes
and changes to registration fees. First, laws limiting or decreasing
copyright protection appear more likely and more consistently to be
associated with an increase in the number of new works registered.
Second, changes in the length of copyright protection appear to be the
least likely to result in a statistically significant relationship to
changes in the number of works registered. Third, laws expanding the
subject matter protected by copyright appear to be the most likely to
reduce subsequent copyright registrations. And fourth, increases in
copyright registration fees are associated with a reduction in the
number of new works registered, though this relationship is not
constant across all categories of works. 15 5 While increases in
registration fees were associated with a decrease in copyright
registrations for serials and motion pictures, we found no statistically
significant associations between registration fees and monograph or
performing arts registrations. However, we did find a positive
association between an increase in registration fees and sound
recording registrations.
These results do not imply that individual legal changes may
not influence the number of new works created. They only imply that
probability and direction of change are extremely difficult to predict.
Whether any given legal change will have an effect, what category of
works will be affected, and whether a relationship will be positive or
negative are never certain-although our data do show that any
relationship is more likely to be positive, especially when the legal
change decreases copyright protection. Furthermore, our results
should not be interpreted to suggest that some individuals are not in
fact influenced to create new works by these legal changes. The artists
who testify before Congress in favor of increases in copyright
protection, among others, may very well be so influenced. Our findings
merely suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship in

155. These last two observations are consistent with Landes and Posner's results with much
more complete and detailed data and by subcategories rather than all copyright registration
combined. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 245-46.
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the aggregate. 156 For every individual motivated to higher levels of
productivity, a similar number may be deterred by the change in the
law.
In the end, population is the only variable consistently
associated with changes in the number of new copyright registrations.
Once we controlled for the change in registration rules, growth in
population was consistently associated with increases in copyright
registrations for all the categories of works studied. Population as a
variable is also consistently sturdier than legal changes. 15 7
In their study, Landes and Posner hypothesized that the
importance of population could be explained as a function of the size of
the market for copyrighted works. 58 In other words, as population
increases, the number of people interested in access to creative works
grows. This increase in demand leads to a corresponding increase in
supply. 159 While this hypothesis is certainly one possible explanation,
changes in population may affect the supply side of the equation as
well. In other words, a growing population may produce more artistsor, as some have more recently described it, a larger "creative
class"16 0-and these artists may produce creative works regardless of
the legally created incentives available or even actual market
demand. 16 1 Accordingly, as society grows, we may find in our midst
more Edgar Allan Poes162 who are willing to create regardless of the
circumstances or opportunities for success and remuneration. More
likely, the relationship between population and new works is a
combination of the two, with population growth expanding both the
creative class and the individuals that comprise the market for
156. A Simpson's paradox occurs when the results of subgroup studies contradict those of a
combined study in which the subgroup data are lumped together. This is not statistically
surprising because what happens in a subgroup may not apply to the whole group, and vice
versa. In a combined study, a group's gain can be cancelled by another group's loss. See Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Simpson's Paradox, Aug. 6, 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/paradox-simpson.
157. In the most extreme case-performing arts registrations-population exhibited a tvalue of 178.5619 compared to the highest t-value (5.1495) for a legal change, the Supreme
Court's Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), decision. App. 1, tbl.6.
158. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 245.
159. Id.
160. See RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 67-68 (2002).

161. Our conclusion is similar to Michael Kremer's work in which he determined that "an
increase in population leads to an increase in technological change." Kremer, supra note 15, at
681. In other words, "a higher population means more potential inventors." Id. at 684.
162. Poe is often considered one of the first American authors to attempt to make a living as
a writer and suffered great financial difficulty as a result. See JEFFREY MEYERS, EDGAR ALLAN
POE: HIS LIFE AND LEGACY 138 (1992); ARTHUR HOBSON QUINN, EDGAR ALLAN POE: A CRITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 305 (1941).
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creative works. Consequently, our research suggests that there is little
empirical support for the proposition that increasing copyright
protection yields a greater bounty of copyrighted works. In fact, the
data tentatively suggest the opposite: to the extent that legal changes
matter, laws reducing copyright protection are more likely to increase
the number of new copyrighted works.
In summary, our study demonstrates that the effect of legal
changes on copyright registrations is neither predictable nor uniform.
While individual legal changes have historically been associated with
changes in copyright registrations, it is extremely difficult to predict:
(1) whether any given legal change will have such an effect; (2) what
category or categories of works will be affected; and (3) when there is a
relationship, whether that relationship will be positive or negative. In
other words, when lawmakers consider whether to expand copyright
law, the most they can expect in general is a 38 percent chance that
the new law will increase the number of new registrations for some
unknown category of work. The likelihood changes depending upon
the type of legal change at issue. The least effective strategy is to
expand the subject matter of copyright, as this type of legal change is
more likely to reduce registrations rather than increase them. If
lawmakers wish to decrease the number of works registered,
increasing copyright registration fees is more likely to produce that
result. Instead, if lawmakers wish to increase the number of new
works registered, the best strategy is to limit or decrease copyright
protection-and even then the result is far from guaranteed.
V. WHY THE DISCONNECT?

In order to understand why changes in copyright law do not
have the expected relationship with creative output, this Part explains
why the principal economic model is incomplete. However, before
beginning this discussion, it is important to emphasize what this
study does not suggest. First, it does not suggest that copyright law
has no relationship to creative production, or that the same or an even
greater number of creative works would exist in a world without
copyright law. Some form of copyright protection has existed in the
United States since 1783,163 and our study begins with registrations in
1870, so the existence of copyright law is a baseline for this study. Our
study therefore focuses upon whether changes to that baseline relate
to changes in the number of new works registered. Second, our results
163. Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright: 1783-1969, http://www.
copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
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do not suggest that the individuals who testified before Congress were
lying or otherwise behaving in a strategic manner. It is quite possible
that those individuals genuinely believed that changes in copyright
law would lead to a change in their behavior. As discussed above, as a
statistical matter, our findings may well represent another example of
Simpson's Paradox, where the relationship between variables at the
subgroup level is different from those relationships in the aggregate.
For example, for every individual genuinely motivated by the new
incentives, there may be an equal number deterred. In this Part, we
discuss why the traditional economic model upon which our original
hypotheses were based is incomplete and why even under a wealthmaximizing, rational actor model increasing copyright protection is
164
unlikely to increase the number of new works produced.
Consider the traditional economic model of copyright. In an
earlier work, Landes and Posner provided this succinct description:
"For a new work to be created, the expected return-typically, and we
shall assume exclusively, from the sale of copies-must exceed the
expected cost."'165 And the cost of creating the work "consists primarily
of the author's time and effort plus the cost to the publisher of
soliciting the manuscript and setting it in type."'166 Accordingly, the
rational individual seeking to increase her wealth would measure
these costs against the expected return. By preventing free riding,
copyright law makes it possible for an author to secure the necessary
expected return from a successful work. This is considered necessary
because if individuals were free to copy the author's work without
incurring the cost of creating the work, competition would drive down
the expected return of the work to the point where the author would
be unable to recoup those costs and thus would be unwilling to create
the work in the first instance. As discussed above, the argument based
upon this model for increasing copyright protection is essentially that
increasing copyright protection increases incentives to create new
works. When Congress or the courts increase the amount of copyright
protection available to authors, a rational author seeking to increase
her wealth will respond by creating more works. While this model
does a good job of describing the public good nature of creative works

164. This discussion assumes that there is no distinction between creators of copyrighted
works and the owners of copyrights. As such, some of the disconnect between legal changes and
behavior may be the result of a disjunction between authors and copyright owners either because
their interests do not align or because the reality of who actually owns the copyright obscures
both the perceived and actual rewards available to creators as a result of the legal change.
165. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989).

166. Id. at 327.
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and how those works may be underproduced as a result of piracy, it
does not accurately represent the decision to create a work in the first
place.
An initial criticism of this analysis is that this model does not
account for the fact that copyright law represents a potential cost in
the creation of new works. Because no author creates in a vacuum,
increasing copyright protection is a double-edged sword. While new
laws may increase the potential reward for creating, they
simultaneously increase the cost of creating in two ways. First, in
order to create a new work, the author of a new work may be required
to obtain permission from another copyright owner, thus incurring
transaction costs and potentially the cost of a license or royalty
payment. As a result, an author may decide to alter her work or create
an entirely different work from the one she intended to avoid
incurring those expenses or potential liability. Under either
circumstance, the additional costs created as a result of increasing
copyright protection may be sufficient to deter the creation of new
works.
Recognizing this limitation, Landes and Posner more recently
167
set forth a model taking the cost of copyright law into account.
According to the authors:
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Some copyright protection is
necessary to generate incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works. But
too much protection can raise the costs of creation to a point at which current authors
cannot cover their 8costs even though they have complete copyright protection for their
' 16
own originality."

Assuming that Landes and Posner's more detailed model better
reflects the costs and benefits associated with changes in copyright
law, two points arise. First, while the authors consider the possibility
that increasing copyright protection could ultimately "raise the costs
of creation to a point at which current authors cannot cover their
costs, 116 9 they do not consider the possibility that the increase in costs

167. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13, at 73 ('The supply of works will equal N = N(R, z)
where NR > 0 and Nz < 0. The net effect on N of an increase in copyright protection (z) depends
upon the balance between two effects because the increase leads to both a movement up the
supply curve of works (as R increases) and an upward shift of the supply curve as z drives up the
cost of expression. Thus dN/dz = NR(dR/dz) + Nz. At low levels of z, the revenue-enhancing effect
of limiting copying by free riders should dominate, so that dN/dz >0. When z is very low, few or
no works may be created, since free riding by copiers may prevent any author from covering his
cost of expression. So N will increase as z increases, at least up to some level, say Z. Beyond z we
assume that increases in the cost of expression to marginal authors will dominate, so that the
number of works will begin to fall.").
168. Id. at 74.
169. Id.
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may offset marginal increases in incentives. In other words, while a
little copyright is good and a lot may be bad, anything in between may
be meaningless when it comes to incentives. Recall the example of
term extension raised by Justice Breyer in Eldred, where he noted
that the estimated present value of the increased length of copyright
protection for even the most successful copyrighted works is seven
cents. 170 When one considers that one of the least expensive licensing
fees-the mechanical royalty rate for a compulsory license to cover
another author's song-is 9.1 cents, 171 it is not difficult to imagine that
the new costs created by the legal change will offset any new reward.
Second, to the extent that changes in copyright protection
apply to both existing and new works, legal changes may not increase
the number of new works because they favor a strategy of exploiting
existing works rather than creating new ones. Having already created
the initial work, an author does not need to consider whether to create
a different work in response to the legal change. As such, the author
does not incur costs associated with steering clear of potential
liability. Similarly, in those instances when existing works may be
rendered infringing on the rights of earlier works because of
subsequent changes in the law, Congress has often accommodated
those works either by creating specific exemptions for their continued
exploitation or through compulsory licensing. As a result, legal
changes generate lower transaction costs for authors of existing works
than for authors of new ones. Lastly, it is always less costly to copy
than to create something new-especially when a creator copies
herself. Consequently, increasing copyright protection may not
produce increases in the number of new works because the costs
associated with legal changes may lead wealth-maximizing copyright
owners to prefer licensing over creation. This argument should come
as no surprise to those versed in economics: creators in these cases are
engaged in rent-seeking behavior. However, because the economic
model assumes that the question facing authors is a simple binary
question of to create or not to create, this strategy does not appear.
More fundamentally, however, the existing economic model is
incomplete because it is premised upon two erroneous assumptions:
(1) the new work will be successful in the marketplace, and (2) authors
are currently creating fewer works than they are capable of producing.
To demonstrate that copyright is a useful response to the public good
nature of creative works, even Landes and Posner's more detailed
170. 537 U.S.186, 254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY RATES,
MECHANICAL LICENSE (2006), http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html.
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economic model examines an author's incentives in response to
competitor copying by assuming demand for the work. 172 Under these
circumstances, their model actually predicts that increasing copyright
protection will increase the revenues available to copyright owners
and will increase the incentive to produce more copies of the same
work to compete against copiers. While related, their model is not the
same as a model that predicts an individual author's decision whether
to create a new work in a functioning market protected by copyright
law. Nor is it a model that predicts how changes in copyright law will
influence that decision. Any model examining whether changes in
copyright law influence individual incentives to create new works
must consider the possibility that there may be no demand and no
market for the work at all.
Even under a profit-maximizing model, one must discount
potential revenues based upon the likelihood that the public will
desire the work. After all, some works are just as undesirable at half
the price, and some may not find an audience even when given away
for free. In other words, a new work (N) will be created if the
anticipated income (R(z)) created by copyright law (z) discounted by
the probability that the public will actually desire the work (P) is
greater than the cost of the work (C). Cost is a function of opportunity
costs (0), materials (M), and copyright law.173 This inequality may be
formally stated as follows:
If P(R(z)) > C(O,M,z), then N will be produced.
Consider how this decisionmaking process applies to new
authors and established authors. Regardless of whether the odds of
being published are the same as the odds of winning the lottery, or are
just small because new authors do not know if the public will find
their work appealing, new or unknown authors are in the most
difficult decisionmaking position. Even assuming that the basic costs
of creating a new work and the potential revenues are essentially the
same for established authors, new authors are subject to greater
uncertainty and are likely to discount the revenue side of the equation
at a higher rate. For a new author, P is an unknown quantity and
could range anywhere from zero to one. In response, one strategy
could be to keep costs down to a minimum and consider only whether

172. LANDES & POSNER, supranote 13, at 71.
173. Arguably all of this is also subject to a natural limit for talent.
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one's time is better spent creating rather than engaging in some other
174
revenue-producing labor.
Even then, under a wealth maximizing theory, no new works
should be created because a rational wealth-maximizer would not
engage in what is essentially a gamble. In other words, for a new
author, the creative process is a gamble because the losses are
guaranteed while the payoff is uncertain. For example, assume that it
takes 365 ten-hour days to write a book. Further assume that the
writer would have earned ten dollars per hour working at another job
instead of writing. Assuming no additional costs, writing the book cost
the writer $36,500. At a royalty rate of $2.50 per book, the author
would need to sell 14,600 books to break even. Yet there is no
guarantee that the author will sell even a single copy. 175 While the
author can do more to improve her probability of success-for
example, researching successful works, rewriting her work, attending
seminars, seeking out agents, and learning more about the publication
process-these steps are guaranteed to increase her costs, while the
payoff still remains uncertain. While changes in copyright law may
change both costs and potential payoff, they do little to change the fact
that for a new author, the probability of success, P, is unknown-and
for most new authors, P is also extremely low. As such, changes in
copyright law should have little impact on the number of new works
produced under this model by unknown authors.
Next, consider the decisionmaking process for established
authors. Unlike the new author, we can assume for purposes of this
discussion that the established author's probability of success, P, is
more certain and may even approach one (certain success). For
instance, when an established author obtains an advance from a
publisher sufficient to cover the author's costs, P is probably very
high. Under these circumstances, for changes in copyright law to have
an effect on an established author's productivity, we must assume that
174. Of course, this is a very limited model of human behavior and economists in general
would look to utility rather than simply wealth. In other words, an author may simply prefer to
spend time writing rather than working for $10/hour or prefers that activity to competing leisure
activities. This will be discussed in greater detail later. However, once we move beyond the profit
maximizing preferences, the persuasiveness of the economic incentive justification for copyright
protection diminishes accordingly. In other words, if an artist creates because she values the act
of creation regardless of or beyond the financial rewards associated with creation, then it is no
longer meaningful to speak in terms of the need for law to create financial incentives to
encourage creation. Instead, it is arguably more meaningful to speak in terms of law's role in
giving such individuals opportunities for creation.
175. For comparison purposes, by one estimate, it is possible to have a New York Times best
seller by selling 5,000 hardcover copies in a single week. Tess Gerritsen's Blog, http:I
tessgerritsen.comlblog/2007/07/18/how-many-copies-sold-is-a-bestseller/
(last visited Oct. 8,
2009).
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the author is currently working at less than full capacity. In other
words, the established author is producing fewer works than she is
capable of producing. As such, increasing the potential rewards
available should induce the author to be more productive.
The difficulty with this assumption is that it is inconsistent
with the basic economic model behind copyright law. If copyright law
has done its job against free riders and provided profit-maximizing
authors with the opportunity to recoup their costs for a given work,
those authors should already be producing the maximum number of
works they are capable of producing without sacrificing quality. In
other words, the financial incentive to create new works already exists
because copyright law already creates those incentives by addressing
the underproduction created by free riding. From an incentive
perspective, any additional rewards created by increasing copyright
protection would represent a windfall to copyright owners from
consumers. Under these circumstances, the only way to increase the
176
number of works produced would be to increase productivity.
Generally, increases in productivity are brought about by changes in
technology and pharmacology, not law. If the economic opportunity
already exists, the economic model assumes that homo economicus
will exploit it.
Some readers might note that if people actually behaved like
homo economicus-risk averse and seeking only to maximize wealththere would be no creative works except those funded in advance
through some system of patronage. Nonetheless, people continue to
create even when they are unknown and their likelihood of success is
small. One might explain this behavior by rejecting the rational actor
model and positing that individuals create for reasons beyond
financial remuneration-in other words, individuals do not always
behave rationally. While both of these factors are probably at play in
the decision to create, we need not abandon the rational actor model
for the purposes of this discussion. Even if one accepts that under
certain circumstances, this behavior can still be considered rational,
changes in copyright protection are still unlikely to change individual
behavior.
Consider the case of lotteries. Edward McCaffery argues that
even playing the lottery is a rational decision because for some
individuals, playing the lottery is the only legally available means of

176. This assumes that creativity is purely a function of labor rather than talent, insight, or
inspiration.
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obtaining greater economic freedom. 177 Moreover, those individuals
prefer playing the lottery over other uses of their money. 178 For
authors and artists, while it may be irrational to starve or freeze to
death because of their love of music or poetry, after meeting their
basic needs, it may well be rational for them to spend their spare time
creating. Not only may authorship be what one prefers to do, it may
also be the best strategy for dramatically improving one's economic
well-being.
So should changes in copyright law change the behavior of new
authors under these circumstances? The answer is once again no, but
the reason is now the same as that for established authors. In order to
encourage more creativity from these individuals, we must once again
assume that prior to the legal change they were creatively
underproductive. Put differently, we must assume that before the
legal change individuals who had the talent and inclination to spend
their time creating works and who realized that succeeding as an
author was really their only strategy for obtaining greater economic
freedom did not have sufficient motivation to create. They were not
working hard enough after waiting tables, working at the assembly
line, or sitting in front of a computer monitor.
As long as copyright law responds to the public good problem of
creative works, the law already makes it possible for these individuals
to escape their current financial conditions, and rational individuals in
their situation should already be creating as much as their
circumstances allow. In other words, if I know that by spending my
evenings writing a book, I could become a billionaire like J.K. Rowling,
but I choose to watch television instead, why would changing
copyright law change my behavior? Fully understood, even the wealthmaximizing, rational actor model of copyright does not support the
idea that increasing copyright protection beyond the protection
necessary to address the public good problem will increase the number
of copyrighted works produced. While increasing copyright law will
provide greater financial rewards to authors, it does little to change
their incentives to create new works.
VI. CONCLUSION: CAN LAW ENCOURAGE GREATER CREATIVITY?

Until now, the theory that increasing copyright protection
increases incentives to produce more new works-and therefore leads

177. Edward J. McCaffrey, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV.
71,102.
178. See id.
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to the production of more works-has gone largely untested. In this
Article, we tested this theory using statistical analysis and
demonstrated that one cannot predict when a legal change will be
associated with a change in copyright registrations. Furthermore, we
argue that the theoretical model upon which this hypothesized
relationship has been based is incomplete.
Our study suggests that when lawmakers consider whether to
expand copyright law, there is little empirical or theoretical support
for the position that increasing copyright protection will increase the
number of new works created. Based upon the historic data, the most
that can be expected is a 38 percent chance that the new law will be
associated with an increase in the number of new registrations for
some unknown category of work. In contrast, lawmakers are more
likely to find a relationship between an increase in the number of new
works and those laws that reduce or otherwise limit copyright
protection, and even then the relationship is far from guaranteed.
Expecting a legal change to increase the number of new copyrighted
works is akin to shooting a gun with both live ammunition and blanks
at targets moving in the dark. You will occasionally hit a target, but
you will not know when this will happen or which target you will hit.
Population size, not law, is uniformly and consistently the best
predictor of the number of new works produced.
Given these findings, one might be tempted to jump to the
conclusion that copyright law does not matter. Nothing, however,
could be further from the truth. While changes in copyright law may
have little to do with the number of new copyrighted works created,
this does not mean that copyright law has no impact. First, copyright
law clearly plays a role in the creation and distribution of wealth. By
one estimate, in 2005 the value added to U.S. GDP by the "core"
copyright industries was $760.49 billion; that number increases to
$1.38 trillion with the inclusion of all copyright industries. 179 These
industries employed 5.38 million and 11.32 million individuals,
respectively.18 0 Copyright law clearly helps create and protect this
wealth and these jobs. Likewise, the recent $100 million judgment in
favor of Mattel's Barbie dolls against the manufacturer Bratz
illustrates that the stakes-even in individual copyright cases-can be
quite high.18 1 So while increases in copyright protection may not

179. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2006 REPORT 2

(2006), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2006-siwek-full.pdf.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Associated Press, Jury Awards Mattel $100M in Barbie-Bratz Lawsuit (Aug. 26, 2008),
available at http://wbztv.com/business/barbie.bratz.lawsuit.2.803672.html.
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provide greater incentives, such protection certainly is an important
82
basis for distributing wealth in society.1
Second, because our data began with changes to copyright law
following 1870, our study only examined whether those changes
influenced the number of new works subsequently produced. Our
study did not address whether those works would have been created
absent copyright or under a less protective regime. Moreover, while
creativity may occur absent copyright law, our model did not question
the position that a basic level of copyright protection is necessary to
combat the underproduction of creative works that is likely to result
from piracy.
Third, because this study focused upon copyright registrations,
we do not know the impact of copyright's expansion on the large body
of creative works outside the copyright regime. To the extent that
creators of these works fear liability and criminal prosecution,
copyright's expansion-especially its more recent, well-publicized
expansion' 83-may be deterring an unknown number of valuable
creative works. Alternatively, copyright may have absolutely no effect
on these works at all; we simply do not know.
If increasing copyright protection is unlikely to increase the
number of new works created, what can society do to encourage
creativity? While a full discussion of these strategies is beyond the
scope of this Article, we can outline four suggestions:
(1) Improve the likelihood of success. If we want people to create
more works, we could take steps to make it more worth their time and
effort. Rather than focusing on expanding the jackpot, we could take
steps to improve the odds that authors would recoup their investment
in creativity, even if the rewards are smaller. We could increase direct
funding for the arts or increase the number of prizes available for new
works. We could also facilitate the distribution and accessibility of
creative works, making it easier for authors to reach small audiences.
To the extent that copyright law and its theories of secondary liability
stand in the way, they should be amended. To the extent that
incumbent businesses place roadblocks in the way, they should be
removed.
(2) Reduce the cost of creation. Related to improving the
likelihood of success is the strategy of reducing the cost of creation.
182. There may very well be good and sound public policy reasons for providing authors with
greater rewards. Our study, however, casts serious doubt on the idea that the incentives
argument can reasonably be considered one of them.
183. See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, YouTube Users Caught in Warner Music Spat, CNET NEWS
(Jan. 27 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10150588-93.html (reporting some of the
copyright problems created by YouTube videos).
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The easier it is to create, the more likely people are to create. Teach
people to create, provide them with the skills and expertise, provide
them with the physical tools, and provide them with the opportunity
to create. Take advantage of technologies that reduce the cost of
creation, communication, and interaction, reduce copyright protection
when it is a barrier to creativity, and reduce transactions costs,
including registration fees.
(3) Recognize the saliency and optimism bias. If our preceding
strategies aspire to improve the actual likelihood of "success," this
strategy seeks to influence the perceived likelihood of "success."
Researchers in the cognitive sciences have identified two important
aspects of human decisionmaking that are relevant here. First,
individuals tend to be overly optimistic about their chances of success.
Second, individuals tend to estimate the probability of something
occurring by how easily they may recall something similar.1 84 While
we should not exploit these biases as a means of manipulation, we
should recognize the problems created by bounded rationality and
take steps to ensure that people have the opportunity to satisfy their
genuine preferences. These goals can be achieved in part through
suggestion four.
(4) Genuinely value creativity and the arts. If the intent behind
copyright law's expansion is to send a message that society values
creativity, that message is far from clear. Copyright expansions and
the changes associated with them are more likely to signal that some
forms of creativity (or even some groups in society) are favored and
others disfavored. Because copyright law works in the negativeeffectively saying "do not use this work, do not copy this work, do not
imitate this work"-we are not sending a message that society values
the creation of new works. We are only sending the message that we
should stay away from those works already created. By taking the
steps outlined above in suggestions one and two, we would send a
clear message that we value creativity. Moreover, recognizing the
issues of bounded rationality outlined in suggestion three, that
message should be reinforced publicly, prominently, and regularly by
honoring and recognizing the creators among us. This recognition
would make it easier for people to recall the success stories of authors,
and it would encourage them to become authors themselves.
This outline is not easy, but neither is creativity. For hundreds
of years, the logic of copyright's expansion has been so compelling, and
the means so seemingly inexpensive and simple, that lawmakers have
184. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC,
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (1982).
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not seriously contemplated other methods for encouraging creativity.
Unfortunately, our study suggests that this theory behind copyright's
expansion is flawed. The evidence strongly suggests that the means do
not achieve the desired ends. While increasing copyright protection
provides authors with greater financial rewards, it does little to
change their incentives to create new works. If we truly want to
encourage the creation of new works, we must rethink and re-envision
the relationship between law and human creativity and ensure that
copyright law provides bounty, not booty.
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APPENDIX 1: FORMAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The following demonstrates our statistical analyses supporting
the arguments in paper. We want to emphasize that the seven
"individual" relationships between the number of the copyright
registrations in each of the seven categories (monographs, serials,
performing arts, motion pictures, photography, sound recording, and
visual arts) and the five possible explanatory variables18 5 (year,
population, GDP, copyright registration fee, and law/technology
changes) may be different among themselves and may not represent
the "overall" relationship between the total number of copyright
registrations and the explanatory variables. Therefore, we conducted
careful statistical analyses to find eight best models that fit the data
and represent the seven individual and one overall relationship. The
first step in our analyses was an exploratory data analysis ("EDA"),
which is important in setting a basis for next-step formal model fitting
and data analyses.
Exploratory Data Analysis
The explanatory variables include Year, GDP (the real gross
domestic product per capita), Pop (population in thousands), Fee (the
copyright registration fee adjusted for inflation), and Law/Technology
changes (the year when a new law or technology change became
effective).18 6 The Year and Pop variables are highly correlated, having
almost a perfect linear relationship.1 8 7 Indeed, the relationships
between the number of copyright registrations and year, and the
number of copyright registrations and population, are very similar as
shown in Chart 2 and Chart 11. Thus, in our final models, we expect
that either the Year or Pop variables (but not both) will be chosen as a
significant explanatory variable. This is consistent with Landers &
Posner's observation that the year variable largely picks up the
increase in population.

185. The synonyms for independent variables in a regression model include explanatory
variables and covariates. Also, here the law and technology changes represent a group of eightysix dummy variables.
186. Among these five variables, the law and technology changes happened in eighty-six
years during 1870 to 2006, and hence the fifth group 'law/technology changes" represent eightysix dummy variables.
187. See Chart 10.
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CHART 10. POPULATION VS. YEAR (1870-2006)
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In Charts 11 and 12, the total number of copyright
registrations and the number of registrations for each of the seven
subcategories are plotted against population and year. A "+" marks
the years in which the law supposedly increased protection, while a "-"
represents the years in which laws limited protection. An "x"
represents laws that both increased and limited protection. Our
formal statistical analyses below will examine if the data support
these normative perceptions about copyright laws.
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12. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION PER SUBCATEGORIES VS.
POPULATION (YEAR)
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From Chart 11, the total number of copyright registrations
apparently had an overall upward trend for more than a century
despite a bump around 1929. The trend has become less clear and
more volatile since 1990, which is probably due to the large number of
laws introduced after 1989. Moreover, some supposedly positive legal
changes did not seem to have the expected positive impacts on the
total number of copyright registrations.
In Chart 12, four categories-monograph, serials, performing
arts, and visual arts registrations-spanned the entire time range
(1870-2006), while two categories-motion pictures and photographshad their data ends in 1980s, and one category-sound recordinghad its data starting in 1980s. The first three categories-monograph,
serials, and performing arts registrations-were the dominant
categories driving the total number of registrations. Until 1989, these
three categories appeared to have a similar overall trend to that of
total copyright registrations. The only difference was that monograph
and serials registrations had a bump around 1929, while the
performing arts registrations peaked a few years later. Monographs
stayed relatively flat during 1930s and 1940s, and they started to
increase during the 1950s. In contrast, performing arts were flat from
1905 to 1930. The stagnation of monograph registrations was probably
due to the Great Depression that started in 1929 and lasted into the
1930s and early 1940s. The Great Depression had devastating effects
to the economy, and perhaps also stifled creativity or copyright
registrations because survival was the priority.
After 1989, monograph registrations seemed to continue their
upward trend (though in a slower rate than before 1989), while serials
and performing arts registrations shifted to a downward trend. The
monograph's upward trend likely offset the downward trends in
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serials and performing arts registrations, leading to the unclear trend
shown in the total overall registrations after 1989 in Chart 11. Also,
the variances of the numbers of copyright registrations became
volatile for most categories after the critical year of 1989. To confirm
and test this visual observation statistically, we conducted a change
point analysis. While registration rules changed following 1989, the
changes after this year might also be evidence that new technology
hurt the number of subscriptions for serials, performing arts, and even
for monographs (since the number of monograph registrations grew
more slowly after 1989).
Among the seven categories, sound recording registrations,
created in 1972, had the shortest span of history, extending until
2006. Motion picture copyright registration had the second shortest
life span from 1913 to 1983. Motion picture copyright registrations
peaked in 1961, and then declined until 1970 before increasing
dramatically again. Photographic registrations (also ending in 1983)
peaked around 1912 before motion pictures copyright registrations
were given their own category. It might have taken some time for the
old classification of including motion pictures in photographic
registrations to end either because of the changes in technology (i.e.,
moving to film) or practice. Since some of the motion picture copyright
registrations dwelled under photographic copyright registrations for
an unknown period of time, modeling the photographic registrations
data will be meaningless. Therefore, we did not perform a formal
statistical analysis on the photograph registration data. An
interpretation of a model fitted to motion pictures registrations should
also take into the consideration that a small portion of its early data
(around 1915) might have remained in the photographic group.
Visual arts registrations peaked around 1910 (note its scale in
the Y-axis in comparison to that of photographic registrations), then
flattened during the 1950s, and peaked again around 2000. However,
like the other registrations, the visual arts trend also became volatile
after 1989.
Based on the findings from the simple exploratory data
analysis above, we conducted the following analyses for six copyright
categories-monographs, serials, performing arts, motion pictures,
sound recordings, and visual arts registrations-using the following
methodology:
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Step 1. We used change point analysis18 8 to detect if and when
an abrupt change had taken place under a logarithm linear or
quadratic model. All the results on monographs, serials, performing
arts, and visual arts copyright registrations data indicated year 1989
was the change point location.
Step 2. Since the numbers of copyright registrations were
measured longitudinally through the period of 1870-2006, we applied
a time series model to the residuals in each of our regression analyses.
Step 3. We fitted nonparametric curves to the data in an
attempt to guide us in choosing suitable parametric models in Step 4.
Nonparametric simultaneous confidence bands1 8 9 ("SCB") for
nonparametric curves were superimposed to the fitted nonparametric
regression curves. Specifically, in our nonparametric model we
assumed an additive error structure for longitudinal data x:
Yi = f(xi)+ ti,
and constructed SCBs through the software package Locfit in Splus.
Chart 13 displays the results. Incorporating the change point analysis
with SCB allowed us to obtain better, more objective inferences.
It is clear from Chart 13 that for most categories a simple
parametric model-such as a linear regression, quadratic, or logtransformation-cannot adequately capture the data pattern over the
entire period from 1870 to 2006. Specially, these parametric models
failed to capture the bump of the latter 1920s, the plateau during
1930s and 1940s, and the heteroscedasticity of variance before and
after 1989. Instead, a segmented multiple log-linear regression
analysis for each category of copyright registrations, as described in
Step 4 below, provided a much better fit to the data.

188. See S. J. Ganocy, Estimation Problems from Data with Change Points (Aug. 2003)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University), available at
http://stat.cwru.edu/- sjganocy/sjg.pdf.

189. Jiayang Sun, Jonathan Raz & Julian J. Faraway, Confidence Bands for Growth and
Response Curves, 9 STATISTICA SINICA 679, 679-98 (1999).
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CHART 13. NONPARAMETRIC SIMULTANEOUS CONFIDENCE BANDS FOR
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS OF MONOGRAPHS, SERIALS, PERFORMING
ARTS, MOTION PICTURES, SOUND RECORDING, AND VISUAL ARTS
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Step 4. We fitted the best-segmented regression models in the
form of equation (1) below to five categories: monographs, serials,
performing arts, motion pictures, and sound recordings. We only
applied nonparametric analysis to the visual arts data because a
piecewise log-linear or log-quadratic model cannot fit the data
reasonably well.
Segmented log-linear model: For years from 1870 to 1989, the
model has the form:
Logio(Y)

=

)60 +

6 3 Logi o(Fee) +

/ALogio(GDP) +
-cLi +

632 Logio(Pop) +

dj Tj + e(1),

(1)

where Y is the number of copyright registrations of a given category;
GDP, Pop, and Fee are as explained in the first paragraph of this
Appendix; e is the random error; and Li and Tj are the dummy
variables representing a legal (or technology) change starting from its
effective date (a year after its introduction) and continuing until to the
end of the study. For data in years 1989 to 2006, our models are
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similar to equation (1), although the estimated coefficients-fl, ci and
dj-and their statistical significances are different from those in early
period 1870-1989. See the results in Tables 1 to 9.
During the regression analysis in Step 4, legal change and
technology change effects were set one year later. We assumed that it
took about one year for these to take effect on the number of
registrations. We also performed analyses in which legal and
technology changes were lagged by two and three years respectively,
but we concluded that the one-year lag was the best-fit model.
For each of five categories, we fit and examined a time series
regression model by iteratively estimating the regression coefficients
/8, ci and dj, and the covariance structure of e, as follows:
Step 1. Computed an initial regression fit to equation (1)
without assuming any correlation structure on e, using the OLS. This
provides initial estimates of 8, ci and dj, and the residuals 6.
Step 2. Ran the autoregressive and moving average ("ARIA")
procedure in SAS software on the residuals to identify the best ARMA
model, via the Bayesian information criterion ("BIC"), for the
covariance of e. This step also provided estimated AR and MA
coefficients.
Step 3. Computed a generalized regression fit that incorporates
the estimated ARMA covariance structure1 90 using the generalized
least square ("GLS") procedure.
Step 4. Performed a stepwise model selection procedure to
choose the significant explanatory variables under the time series
regression model. This step also provided updated residuals and
estimated regression coefficients.
Step 5. Returned to Step 2 and continued until the
convergence, or the differences between the successive regression
coefficients and ARMA coefficients were negligible. The final models
for each of the categories are listed in the following sections.
Study in each category
(1) Monographs copyright registration analysis
For data between 1870 and 1989, from SAS output, an
ARMA(0, 1) model with a moving average parameter MA = -0.1521
had the lowest BIC, and hence, was chosen. The resulting estimated
coefficients for those in equation (1) are given in Table 1 below.

190. Such a generalized model is called a time series regression model.
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TABLE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MONOGRAPH COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1870-1989)

Factors
(Intercept)
Logio(GDP)
Logio(Pop)

Coefficients
flo
81
fl2

Law1870
Law1886

C1870

Lawl909

C1909

Law1912

C1912

Law1971
Law1980
Law1982
Tech1877
Tech1882
Tech1896
Techl900
Tech1921
Tech1924
Tech1926
Tech1928
Tech1932

C1971

Tech1941

C1886

c198o
C1982

d1877

d1882
d1896
d19 oo
d1921

d1924
d 1926
d1928

d1932
d19 4 1

Tech1943
d 1943
Tech1946
d1946
Tech1950
d 1950
Tech1969
d1969
Multiple R2 = 0.9987

Estimated
coefficients
-5.8851
0.1591
1.9563
-1.0946
0.0981
-0.128
0.0213
0.0254
-0.0332
0.0553
0.1492
0.0509
-0.1445
0.1122
0.1116
0.0671
-0.1815
-0.0453
-0.05
-0.1287
-0.042
0.0439
-0.0923
0.025

Corresponding
t value
-9.7066
2.6502
12.8244
-9.1502
7.8905
-9.2233
1.6179
1.6386
-2.1431
3.4506
12.1993
3.8372
-11.8505
9.2377
8.4844
3.6223
-8.7622
-2.5386
-4.3561
-6.1785
-2.2756
2.693
-7.2653
1.579

Pr(> I t)
0.0000
0.0094
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1090
0.1046
0.0346
0.0008
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0005
0.0000
0.0127
0.0000
0.0000
0.0251
0.0084
0.0000
0.1176

The R 2 in Table 1 is very close to 1, which is not surprising,
because the R2 of the regression of the number of registrations on the
first three explanatory variables-GDP, Pop, and Fee (hereinafter
"Main Factors")-alone was 0.96. With the legal and technology
changes as additional explanatory variables, the remaining variation
in the number of registrations (that was not captured by the Main
Factors) was mostly accounted for. Of course, one might worry about
over fitting with too many law and technology dummy variables in the
model. In our analyses, pre-filtering and a stepwise variable selection
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procedure were performed to eliminate obvious nuisance variables and
to determine the statistically significant law and technology variables
shown in Table 1 (which constitute a subset of all the law and
technology variables). The significance of these variables is fairly
consistent with what is shown in the partial regression plot in Chart
14, explained in detail below.
Interpretation. Based on equation (1), the estimated
relationship (in the original scale) between the number of
registrations and the significant explanatory variables shown in Table
1 is
Y cLi+Jdj7,

S= 10 fl (GDP)l1 (P op )i2 (Fee)6 (10) 1

(2)

The law and technology variables not shown in Table 1 have
zero coefficients. An interpretation of the significant coefficients-fl, Ci,
and dj-must take into consideration a multiple regression in which
all significant explanatory variables were working together
simultaneously. So, for example, fl2=1.9563 contributed to Y (the
number of monograph copyright registrations) in terms of a
multiplication factor of (Pop)1.9563. In statistics, the coefficients like fl2
are called partial regression coefficients. Partial regression coefficients
are the slope of a simple regression of E2 on Ei. For f12 = 1.9563, E2 is
the residual of Logio(Y) regressed on all other factors such as GDP,
Fee, Li, and T; thus, E2 is the remaining variation in Logio(Y) after
removing the variation captured by these factors. E1 is the residual of
the population factor Logio(Pop) regressed on GDP, Fee, Li's, and Tj's;
in other words, El is the remaining variation in Logio(Pop) after
removing the effect of these specified factors. Hence, this partial
regression coefficient will generally be different from the coefficient in
a simple regression of the original number of registrations, Logio(Y),
regressed on the population, Logio(Pop). A simple regression often
misses the contribution of other factors, leading to omitted variable
bias.
Partial regression coefficients sometimes have same signs with
those of their corresponding individual coefficients. When a partial
regression coefficient has a different sign from that of its
corresponding individual coefficient, it simply means that this
explanatory variable is included in the model to adjust for its effect
that has already been captured in some degree in other explanatory
variables that are correlated with this particular explanatory variable.
Chart 14 is our modified version of a typical partial regression
plot, in the base-10 logarithm scale, on the contributions or effects of
legal and technology changes to the monograph copyright
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registrations (after considering the effects of main explanatory
variables, such as GDP, the population, and fee) before 1989. Based on
Table 1, the fee is not a significant explanatory variable, so it will not
appear in the remaining discussion in this paragraph. A typical
partial residual plot is a plot of E1 against E2, in which, in our case, E2
is the residual of the number of monograph registrations regressed on
log(GDP) and Log(Pop), and E1 would be the residuals of legal and
technology change variables regressed on Log(GDP) and Log(Pop).
Since law and technology both changed over the time period, and their
enactment should be independent of GDP and Pop, in our modified
version, we used the same E2, but replaced Ei by the Year on the Xaxis and marked the Year points by triangles if the significant legal
and technology changes were found in our analysis.
This plot can be used to visually examine if the coefficients in
Table 1 are reasonable. For example, the Law1886 variable has a
coefficient 0.0981 in Table 1. Thus, according to equation (1), the laws

of 1886 contributed a multiplication factor of

100.0981 =

1.2534 to the

number of monograph copyright registrations starting from the year
1887. This positive contribution is indicated by an upward triangle
(the third from the left) in Chart 14. This point is consistent with the
pattern of neighboring points, which all increase in the next year. All
the directions except two boundary ones (the first and the last) of the
triangles are consistent with the impacts expected from the
corresponding legal and technology changes. Hence the estimated
directions and coefficients in Table 1 are consistent with the data.
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CHART 14. PARTIAL REGRESSION PLOT OF NUMBER OF
REGISTRATION OF MONOGRAPHS

Partial Regression Plot of Log-Monograph
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Caption of Chart 14: This modified partial regression plot of
log-transformed monograph is a scatter-plot of residuals of Logio(l) =
Logio(GDP) + Logio(Pop) graphed against the Year. The significant
years with legal changes or technology changes are marked by
triangles filled with colors. Legal changes are marked in blue, while
technology changes are marked in red. Furthermore, the upwardpointing triangles indicate a legal or technology change that had a
positive effect, and the downward-pointing triangles indicate a legal or
technology change that had a negative effect. We can see the pure
effects of these legal and technology changes on the number of
registrations only after removing the effects of the Main Factors. A
minor negative legal change in the year 1870 resulted in a slight
decline on year 1871. This legal change was followed by two obvious
positive technology changes in 1877 and 1882-which resulted in
increases in years 1878 and 1883-and a positive legal change in 1886
For the data between 1989 and 2006, we found no correlation
in the random error; thus, an OLS fit with a standard stepwise
selection procedure was sufficient for this second part of the
monograph registration data. Although the R2 is still remarkably high,
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the R 2 is much lower for this period than for the 1870 to 1989 period
due to the short span of this time period and the interference of many
legal and technology changes since 1989. Indeed, as Tables 6 and 7
demonstrate, the variance is huge.
TABLE 2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MONOGRAPH COPYRIGHT

REGISTRATIONS (1989-2006)

Factors
(Intercept)
Logio(GDP)

Coefficients
flo
fli

Logio(Pop)

832

Law1990
c1990
Law1995
C1995
Law1997
C1997
Law1998
c1998
Law2001
c2001
Law2003
c2oo3
Multiple R2 = 0.7987

Estimated
Coefficients
-101.357
-12.1719
28.4373
-0.1344
0.0879
0.1319
0.1052
-0.0813
0.1273

Corresponding
t value
-3.7538
-4.3821
4.0955
-2.2787
2.5019
3.3258
2.9393
-2.3847
3.701

Pr(> It)
0.0045
0.0018
0.0027
0.0487
0.0338
0.0089
0.0165
0.0409
0.0049
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(2) Serials copyright registration analysis
An analysis of the data of serials copyright registrations gives
similar results to an analysis of monograph copyright registrations.
An ARMA(0, 1) model with a moving average parameter MA = -0.1885
had the lowest BIC. The resulting estimated coefficients for those in
equation (1) are given in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SERIALS COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1870-1989)

Factors
Coefficients
(Intercept)
o
Logio(GDP)
fli
Logio(Pop)
,l2
Logio(fee)
83
Law1870
C1870
Law1879
C1879
Law1886
C1886
Lawl903
C1903
Law1930
C1930
Law1976
C1976
Law1982
C1982
Law1984
C1984
Tech1882
di 88 2
Tech1890
d 1 890
Tech1900
d 90
Techl907
d 1 9o7
Tech1920
d1920
Tech1926
d 1926
Tech1928
d1928
Tech1932
d19 3 2
Tech1938
d 1 938
Tech1943
d19 4 3
Tech1950
d 1950
Tech1956
d19 56
Multiple R2 = 0.9982

Estimated
Coefficients
-7.3388
-0.2292
2.4742
-0.1373
-1.6885
0.0507
0.0319
-0.0547
-0.0852
0.0401
-0.0479
0.0379
0.0358
0.0789
0.1715
-0.0541
0.0769
0.2348
-0.1151
-0.0877
0.0529
0.0312
-0.0574
-0.0634

Corresponding
t value
-8.3902
-2.97
11.1913
-2.3152
-8.4541
2.6611
1.6927
-2.6729
-2.8749
2.6781
-2.1712
1.6624
1.7245
4.5456
9.409
-1.8686
5.3795
10.5516
-4.0449
-3.9396
2.6693
1.878
-3.6451
-4.0311

Pr(> I t)
0.0000
0.0038
0.0000
0.0227
0.0000
0.0091
0.0938
0.0088
0.0050
0.0087
0.0324
0.0997
0.0878
0.0000
0.0000
0.0647
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0089
0.0634
0.0004
0.0001

During the period from 1989 to 2006, we once again detected no
autocorrelation from the data of serials copyright registrations. The
resulting R 2 is high, which is consistent with the small variances seen
in Charts 12 and 13 for serials copyright registrations.

1738

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1669

TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SERIALS COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1989-2006)

Factors
Coefficients
(Intercept)
83o
Logio(Pop)
/2
Law1994
C1994
Law1998
C1998
Law2003
C2003
Multiple R 2 = 0.9749

Estimated
Coefficients
45.2574
-7.4466

Corresponding
t value
13.3532
-11.8781

Pr(> tl)
0.0000
0.0000

0.1128

5.4062

0.0001

0.0604
0.1138

3.2133
6.4691

0.0068
0.0000
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(3) Performing arts copyright registration analysis
Unlike monographs and serials, the performing arts copyright
registration data between 1870 and 1989 follows an ARMA(0, 3)
model. We selected this model with moving average parameter MA =
(0.0960, -0.6506, -0.3387). The results are listed in Table 5 below.
TABLE 5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PERFORMING ARTS COPYRIGHT

REGISTRATIONS (1870-1989)

Factors

Coefficients

(Intercept)
Logio(Pop)
Law1879
Law1884
Law1897
Lawl902
Law1912
Law1952
Law1973
Law1976
Law1984
Law1988
Tech1877
Tech1890
Tech1891
Tech1895
Tech1896
Techl906
Tech1920
Tech1921
Tech1927
Tech1935

flo
612

Tech1938
Tech1943

d 1938
d 1943

c1879
c1884
c1s97
c1902
c1912
c1952
c1973
c1976
c1984
C19SS

d18 77
dl 89 O
di 91
d18 95
d18 96
d 1906
d 1920
d1 921
d 1927
d 1935

Tech1950
d1 950
Tech1962
d1 962
Tech1969
d1 969
Multiple R 2 = 0.9999

Estimated
Coefficients
-0.0722
0.7562
0.1223
0.0836
0.0611
0.083
-0.0616
0.092
0.0622
0.0419
0.0396
0.0948
0.1223
0.1497
0.1266
0.0863
-0.1395
0.0467
0.0409
-0.0419
0.0291
0.0462
0.0973
0.0834
-0.144
0.05
0.0525

Corresponding
t value
-2.0185
178.5619
4.2264
5.1495
1.8252
4.1804
-5.0205
3.8688
2.5959
2.1937
2.3773
2.6828
3.9016
5.2556
4.149
2.5133
-4.3155
2.6138
1.492
-1.4779
2.4101
2.4433
4.41
5.5285
-5.5938
4.9525
3.1416

Pr(> t I)
0.0464
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0712
0.0001
0.0000
0.0002
0.0110
0.0307
0.0195
0.0086
0.0002
0.0000
0.0001
0.0137
0.0000
0.0104
0.1391
0.1428
0.0179
0.0164
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0023

It is not surprising that no autocorrelation was detected for the
performing arts registrations during the period of 1989-2006. None of
2
the Main Factors were statistically significant. The resulting low R

1740

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1669

value could be due to the large variance caused by frequently
introduced new laws and technologies.
TABLE 6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PERFORMING ARTS COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1989-2006)

Factors
Coefficients
(Intercept)
flo
Law1991
C1991
Multiple R 2 = 0.5381

Estimated
Coefficients
5.2815
-0.1199

Corresponding
t value
208.3709
-4.3172

Pr(> I t)
0.0000
0.0005

(4) Motion picture copyright registration analysis
For motion picture copyright registration data, an ARMA(3, 1)
model with autoregressive parameters AR = (0.7963, -0.0775, -0.5714)
and a moving average parameter MA = -0.81 was chosen because it
had the lowest BIC. The results are listed in Table 7.
TABLE 7. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MOTION PICTURE
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS

Factors

Coefficients

Logio(Pop)
82
Logio(fee)
83
Law1930
C1930
Law1971
C1971
Law1976
C1976
Tech1921
d1921
Tech1924
d1924
Tech1927
d1927
Tech1947
d 1947
Tech1953
d1953
Tech1968
d 1968
2
Multiple R = 0.9999

Estimated
Coefficients
1.64379
-3.7018
-0.15989

0.16688
0.10593
-0.25707
0.12243
0.13903

0.62163
0.15547
-0.21754

Corresponding
t value
9.056
-5.435
-5.372
4.185
2.062
-6.992
2.164
2.488
5.232
9.485
-7.6

Pr(> I t)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0435
0.0000
0.0344
0.0156
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

(5) Sound recording copyright registration analysis
No autocorrelation is detected for the sound recording
copyright registrations before and after change point 1989. Again, this
result may be due to the frequent legal and technology changes during
such a short time period.
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TABLE 8. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1972-1989)

Factors
(Intercept)
Logio(Pop)
Loglo(Fee)
Law1982
Law1988
Tech1972

Coefficients
flo
12

,83
C1982
C1988

d1972

Estimated
Coefficients
-49.2386
9.41911
1.38905
0.12414
-0.08687
0.76992

Corresponding
t value
-5.951
6.722
2.215
3.24
-2
17.824

Pr(> I t 1)
0.0001
0.0000
0.04682
0.00709
0.06864
0.0000

Multiple R2 = 0.9922
As with performing art copyright registrations, Table 9
demonstrates that yet again none of the Main Factors are statistically
significant. Due to the large variance, the resulting R2 has a huge
decrease after the 1989 change point.
TABLE 9. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SOUND RECORDING COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS (1989-2006)

Coefficients
fl0

(Intercept)
Law1998
c1998
Law2003
C2003
Multiple R 2 = 0.7242

Estimated
Coefficients
4.52365
0.08863
0.13336

Corresponding
t value
260.47
2.946
3.325

Pr(> I t)
< 2e-16
0.01001
0.00462
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APPENDIX 2: MAJOR LEGAL CHANGES BY YEAR

Year

Legislation

1870

1870 Revision

jor Cases

Citation

16 Stat. 212 (1870)

1879

Baker v. Selden

101 U.S. 99 (1879)

1884

Burrow-Giles v. Sarony

111 U.S. 53 (1884)

1886

Berne Convention (no U.S.)

1891

International Copyright Treaty

26 Stat. 1106 (1891)

1897

Act of Jan. 6, 1897

29 Stat. 481 (1897)

1902

International Copyright Convention

35 Stat. 1934 (1902)

1903

Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.

188 U.S. 239 (1903)

1908

White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co.

209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908)

1908

Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus

210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908)

1909

Act of 1909

35 Stat. 1075 (1909)

1912

Act of Aug. 24, 1912 (Townsend
Amendment)

37 Stat. 488 (1912)
Herbert v. Shanley

1917

1919

1919 Retroactive Protection Search
Term End and Ad Interim
Amendment

41 Stat. 368 (1919)

1930

Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp.

1939

Washingtonian Pub.
Co. v. Pearson

1941

Act of Sept. 25, 1941

1953

Act of July 17, 1952
Mazer v. Stern

1954

1954

Effective Date of Universal
Copyright Convention

188 U.S. 239 (1917)

45 F.2d 119 (1930)
306 U.S. 30 (1939)
Pub. L. No. 77-258, 55
Stat. 732 (1941)
Pub. L. No. 82-575, 61
Stat. 653 (1952)
347 U.S. 201

68 Stat. 1030 (1954)
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Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76
Stat. 555 (1962)

Act of Sept. 19, 1962.

1964

Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co.

376 U.S. 225 (1964)

1964

Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc.

376 U.S. 234 (1964)

1971

Feb. 15, 1972, Effective Date of Act
of Oct. 15, 1971

Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (1971)
Williams and Wilkins
v. United States

1973

487 F.2d 1345 (1973)

1974

Geneva Phonograms Convention,
(Effective Date March 10, 1974)
(Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms)

1974

July 10, 1974, U.S. Adhered to 1971
Paris Revision of Universal
Copyright Convention

25 U.S.T. 309 ( 1974)
Revised Universal
Copyright Convention:
Hearing on Ex. G. Before
the Comm. on Foreign
Relations of the United
States Senate, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972); S. Exec.
Rep. No. 92-32, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972)

1976

1976 Copyright Act

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976)

1980

Computer Software Copyright Act

1982

Act of May 24, 1982

P.L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (1980) (amending 17
U.S.C. §§101, 117 (1976))
Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96
Stat. 91 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2318 & 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a))

1984

Semiconductor Chip Protection Act

Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98
Stat. 3347 (1984)

1984

Record Rental Amendment

Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98
Stat. 1727 (1984)

1984

Sony Corp. of America,
Inc. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.

464 U.S. 417 (1984)

1985

Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enter.

471 U.S. 539 (1985)

1986

Manufacturing Clause of Copyright
Act Expires

19881

Berne Convention Implementation
Act

Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988)
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Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat.
3949 (1988)

Satellite Home Viewer Act
Community for
Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV) v. Reid

1989
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490 U.S. 730 (1989)

1990

Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)

Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990)

1990

Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act (AWCPA)

Pub. L. 101- 650, 104 Stat.
5133 (1990)

1990

Stewart v. Abend

495 U.S. 207 (1990)

1991

Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Inc.

499 U.S. 340 (1991)

1992
1992
1994

Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106
Stat. 204 (1992)
Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106
Stat. 4237 (1992)
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994)

Copyright Amendments of 1992
(Automatic Renewal Act of 1992)
Audio Home Recording Act
Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA)
Campbell v. Acuff Rose
Music, Inc.

1994

510 U.S. 569 (1994)

1995

Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act

1997

No Electronic Theft Act (NET)

Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995)
Pub. L. 105-147, 111 Stat.
2678 (1997)

1998

The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act (Copyright Term
Extension Act) (CTEA)

Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998)

1998

1999

2005

533 U.S. 483 (2001)
Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116
Stat. 2780 (2002)

Small Webcaster Settlement Act
Eldred v. Ashcroft

2003

2005

Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113
Stat. 1774 (1999)
New York Times Co.,
Inc. v. Tasini

2001
2002

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998)

Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)
Digital Theft Deterrence and
Copyright Damages Improvement
Act

537 U.S. 186 (2003)
Pub.L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat.
218 (2005)

Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act
MGM Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.

545 U.S. 913 (2005)
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APPENDIX 3: TECHNOLOGICAL MILESTONES BY YEAR

Year
1877
1878
1879
1880
1882
1885
1888
1889
1890
1891
1895
1896
1897
1900
1906
1907
1913
1920
1921
1924
1926
1927
1928
1931
1932
1935
1936
1938
1941
1943
1946
1947
1950
1953
1956
1962
1963
1965
1967
1968
1969
1972
1973
1975
1976
1978

Technological Milestones
Edison invented sound recording
Dry plates commercially manufactured for photography
Edison invented light bulb
Founding of Eastman Dry Plate
First electric power station
Linotype and monotype print developed
Invention of Gramophone;
First Kodak Camera
Rotary presses demonstrated
First Kodak film roll camera
Edison invented first motion picture camera Kinetograph
Edison invented Kinetoscope (1 viewer)
Marconi developed radio
Edison introduced inetophones
First theatrical use of Edison vitascope
Braun invented cathode-ray tube
Kodak Brownie camera introduced
Panchromatic black and white film available Invention of the audio vacuum tube
Color film commercially available
35mm still camera
First commercial radio began daily broadcast
First feature film to use sound
First cartoon with soundtrack
First "talkie" film
Flash bulb invented
Movietone soundtrack developed
First television station
Strobe photography
First Technicolor movies
First practical magnetic tape recorder
Kodachrome developed
Sale of first all-electronic television set
NTSC standard adopted
First commercial FM Station
First stereo tape recorder
Introduction of audiotape
First cable television transmission
Invention of the transistor
Photocopying commercially available
9 percent of households with TV
Color television transmission began
Videotape recording demonstrated
Telstar television satellite launched
90 percent of households with TV
Cassette recorder invented
Color instant film developed
Sony Betamax introduced
Sony introduced first portable video recorder
Sony develops Trinitron tube
Arpanet
Intelsat system launched
Digital audio recording
Internet protocol developed
Laser printer
Personal computers developed
Ink jet
First autofocus camera
98 percent of households with TV
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Walkman
Compact Disc invented
CNN launched; first camcorder
First digital still camera
High definition television
Adobe Photoshop released
World Wide Web becomes most-used Internet service (exceeding telnet and ftp);
MP3 codec invented; DVD
iPod

